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Abstract
The 1994 democratic elections, which were the first of their kind in South Africa,
served as a significant turning point for the country as they marked the end of an
oppressive regime and the beginning of a long sought after dispensation;
democracy. The change in dispensation was not only limited to the political sphere
but naturally filtered through to every aspect of South African life including the
broadcasting industry. In fact, leading up to the elections, a number of negotiations
had begun centered around the necessary restructuring of the national broadcaster;
the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). In regard to this moment in
history, Raymond Louw (1993: 01) mentions that, there had "never been a time in
South Africa when debate about media, its conduct, structures, ownership and
control hard] been so intense".
The negotiations were deemed important for a number of reasons. Firstly the media,
by virtue of their perceived power and ability to influence the general public, are a
highly contested domain. It was therefore essential for a consensus to be reached
on how the SABC, for example, would be managed during this time so that no
parties would be left at a disadvantage. Secondly, the SABC had earned a
reputation as the Nationalist government propaganda machine and therefore had to
be freed of this undemocratic burden. The paper is thus a case study of the SABC
and the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA). Issues of
ownership, control, regulation and the role ofpublic service broadcasting will be




South Africa has seen many significant changes in the past few years: the
release of Nelson Mandela in 1992 and the first democratic elections in 1994.
The changes however did not only take place on the political front. The South
African media industry has also been influenced dramatically by the change in
political climate.
During the apartheid era, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)
was seen by many as closely aligned with the national party government. This
proved problematic on a number of levels because the SABC had a monopoly
over broadcasting and as a result voices opposing the government of the day
found it difficult to air their opinions.
In a democratic dispensation such as the South African situation at present, the
airwaves are considered to belong to the public, not just the government or
media moguls. It is therefore important that a situation whereby one political party
or institution has exclusive access to the airwaves is avoided at all costs.
Debates surrounding issues about whether the government should participate
more actively in the regulation of the communications industry, or whether it
should allow for a more liberalised market system, are still unsettled. This paper
will address some of these issues, drawing mainly from the paradigm of political
economy.
This study in essence is a look into the functioning of the current SABC as a
public broadcaster and also the role played by the Independent Communication
Authority of South Africa (ICASA) in ensuring a broadcasting environment that
reflects the democratic principles of the country. The paper study therefore will
examine the relationship between the ICASA, the SABC and the government.
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Along the way, the paper will attempt to answer questions such as: why is it
important to have regulators with an emphasis on public service instead of the
free market system model of broadcasting? What mechanisms are there to
ensure that regulators are not influenced by external forces? What is the role of
the public broadcaster and is this role adequately fulfilled by the SABC? It is also
important to note that this study primarily will concern itself with broadcasting and
not telecommunications even when discussing the ICASA.
The first chapter will be a discussion of the paradigm of political economy where I
will demonstrate why this paradigm is relevant when discussing issues of
regulation and how instrumental it can be in the formulation of solutions to
problems regarding regulation.
The second chapter concerns itself with theories and concepts that inform
regulatory practices today. It is in these sections where I argue that even in a
rapidly changing society owing to technological advancements that point towards
deregulation as a solution; regulation is not only a matter of important but a
matter of necessity.
The third chapter gives a historical background of the advent of broadcasting
where there is a brief discussion on Britain and the United States of America. The
bulk of this chapter addresses specifically the advent of broadcasting in South
Africa and how it was managed.
Chapter four is a discussion of the British Broadcasting Corporation and the
Office of Communications as I will draw comparisons between the British
broadcasting model and the South African since the latter was based on the
former. The chapter will then continue to discuss the South African regulatory
system that is a discussion of the Independent Communications Authority of
Communications.
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Chapter five deals specifically with the concept of public service broadcasting in
relation to the South African Broadcasting Corporation and it is in this chapter
where I argue that the concept of public service broadcasting is flawed and
needs to be redefined in order to address the inconsistencies between theory
and practice.
In chapter six I engage in a final comparison of the broadcasting models of the
two countries in question. I then conclude the study with a few reflective thoughts
and suggestions for a way forward.
Literature Review
Political Economy
This study is essentially a critical analysis of the South African regulatory system,
but before one can undertake such an exercise, it is important to first position the
study within a particular framework that will guide and inform the analysis. The
approach that this study will draw from is that of political economy. This particular
approach is useful and relevant to this study because it concerns itself with the
way in which capitalism, institutions belonging to the state, the public and the
industry all influence each other.
In essence political economy analyses and attempts to explain the dynamics of
social, political and economic interaction. The question to answer at this point
would therefore be: how does regulation feature in the political economy of
communication? One could at least provide two answers in this case. The first
could simply be that whenever there are interactions between powerful 'players',
in this case, the media industry and its owners, the state and the general public,
where there may be divergent interests involved, there needs to be a 'referee'
(Le. an independent regulator) to ensure that all parties are treated fairly and that
stability and order are achieved and maintained. This kind of intervention has
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become increasingly important since there have been examples in the past of
authoritarian states who abuse their power through the control of media output. In
some cases it's the media owners who abuse this power with the interests of the
public being consistently trampled upon. These concerns have lead to substantial
research being conducted, particularly in North America and Europe, around
such matters within the framework of political economy. The second answer
could be that there are in fact different forms and approaches to regulation. One
of these is referred to as capitalist regulation, which comfortably falls within the
ambit of political economy, and can be defined as the study of the transformation
of social relations since, as a result, new forms are created (Aglietta, 1979),
which is what much of this study is about. It is therefore becomes clear that a
political economic approach to communications and the regulation thereof is in a
sense an organic theoretical progression.
At this point it seems necessary to take a closer look at political economy as an
approach, in terms of how it came about and what it is exactly. Vincent Mosco
(1996: 25) describes political economy as the "study of the social relations,
particularly the power relations that mutually constitute the production,
distribution and consumption of resources". From this definition one can deduce
that it requires the analysis of a social dynamic from a more economic
perspective.
There has been and probably still is a lot of disagreement surrounding the issue
of what constitutes political economy; the two main partially conflicting
perspectives on political economy are what has been termed the classical
approach and the neo-classical (Alt and Schepsle, 1990). The classical
approach has its roots in three main traditions (Roll, 1942). The first is the
Lockean tradition of political philosophy derived from the ideas of self-interest,
private property and the labour theory of value. The second was the mercantilist
tradition which contributed the notion of exchange value and finally the French
physiocratic notion of laissez - faire (Gilpin, 1977). This paradigm considered
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institutions as entities that required close monitoring due to their tendency to strip
individuals of independence and freedom in terms of choice and social
interaction. Institutions were also considered inhibitive towards the free flow of
ideas. From this perspective, government therefore, "bore special watchfulness
because the tradition of sovereignty, which gave it power to defend the realm,
could easily be used to create special privileges, including combinations that
would restrain industry and trade" (Mosco, 1996: 40). The pre-1994 government
of South Africa is a particularly good example of this as it held a tight grip on the
broadcasting industry (among others) through its control over the SABC and its
protection as a monopolistic corporation, making it virtually impossible for new
participants to compete for the same market.
In essence, theorists belonging to this school of thought such as Adam Smith
(1937) held the view that government interference/intervention should be kept to
a minimum as it could inhibit the growth of industry and that "individuals were
capable of using reason to maximise their self-interest and, by extension the
interests of society" (Mosco, 1996: 40). This statement comes across as pleasing
and sensible at first glance, but if one understands it correctly, the author is
saying that people are sensible enough to pursue and fulfil their personal needs
and this pursuit of self-interests translates into the interests of society as a whole
being fulfilled as well. If this is the case then, one would have to disagree
because it is precisely the tenacious pursuit of self-interests that has resulted in
the extreme concentration of media ownership in certain parts of the world,
particularly the United States, and this according to many theorists working within
the field of political economy, is not particularly a good situation. It is not ideal
because diversity and pluralism are seriously compromised under such
conditions, which is not good for society as whole. The issues of concentration
and pluralism/diversity will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.
Taking the discussion back to the classical paradigm, it is important to note that
although the intervention or participation of institutions like the government are to
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be scrutinised with great scepticism, even Smith (1937), a major proponent of the
classical paradigm, acknowledged that the government's responsibility should not
be limited to only dealing with national defence. From the way in which the
classical paradigm is presented, particularly with regard to Smith's notions, one
can deduce that it is an encapsulation of the difficult task of balancing two
conflicting ideas: self-interest and benevolence. This dilemma is still being
grappled with by regulators today, with those on the one hand who support the
idea of a free market system and on the other, those in favour of a well regulated
industry where public interests are considered a priority.
The classical paradigm has been extensively criticised by its critics as a result of
it being perceived as defending the idea of an unbridled market due to the
oversimplification of its concepts (Mosco, 1996). Some even went so far as to call
the classical paradigm a 'dismal science', questioning the rationality of a
paradigm that defends the practice of excluding the masses of people from the
fruits of their own sweated labour. An economy that is driven by self-interest is
automatically capitalist and capitalism, as can be argued, thrives on the
exploitation of the labour force and this is precisely why critics view this paradigm
as problematic, it sets out to justify and naturalise, to a certain extent the process
of exploitation (not only of labour).
The neoclassical approach came about as a result of a number of developments
that took place approximately during the last half of the nineteenth century. One
of the more influential developments that gave rise to a shift from the classical to
the neoclassical paradigm came in the form of Bentham's utilitarian attack on the
classical defence of natural law and rights (Mosco,1996). Bentham (1890) argued
that the sole determinants of moral and ethical behaviour should be pain and
pleasure and not a natural code as expressed by the classical paradigm. The
focus in this case is on maximizing pleasure over pain through the
recommendation of the necessary social changes that can bring this about.
Furthermore, this paradigm does not concern itself with the needs or the rights of
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human beings but rather more on the wants. One can therefore deduce that,
although there may be discrepancies regarding the idea of what constitutes
neoclassical economics, it can be generally agreed that this paradigm has two
main concepts at the core of its existence; utility and profit maximization. It is
important to note that similar to the classical paradigm, theorists of the
neoclassical view also held the belief that "[I]nstitutions, which might be
considered as prior to and conditioning individual behaviour are de-
emphasised,,1.
The neoclassical paradigm also has its fair share of critics. It is frequently
criticised for being too idealistic, "it does not focus on actual economies, but
instead on describing a "utopia" in which Pareto optimally obtains"2. A number of
assumptions held by theorists of this paradigm have been criticised, such as the
idea that individuals act rationally. It is clear that this notion ignores certain
aspects of human behaviour such as greed. Some individuals will do whatever it
takes to accumulate. wealth and as a result end up behaving in an irrational
manner, with much disregard for society's best interests. Marxian political
economy criticised the neoclassicists for being too narrow in their focus through
the exclusion of social issues, the state and class struggle. Despite the
weaknesses of the neoclassical paradigm, it seems to have triumphed to a
certain extent as some of its core principles are applied in public policy and what
has evolved out of this paradigm is what is referred to by economists as
mainstream economics.
As earlier mentioned, there are a number of perspectives of political economy
and they seem to be modifications of previous forms, just as the neoclassical
paradigm is a modified version of the classical paradigm and as some may argue
an improvement. Another one of these is referred to as public choice theory or




organizational market that tends to be captured by rent-seeking civil servants
who increase the amount and scope of regulation, even as they restrict access to
valuable information, in order to maximize their gains" (Mosco, 1996: 53). As a
result of such views within the framework of political economy, there was a trend
in the 1980's that favoured deregulation as a solution for the apparent state
restriction on competitive activity.
The Political Economy of Communication
So far the paper has discussed political economy as a theory or explanation for
the advent of capitalism; it is now time to link this theory to the field of
communication studies. In this section, the paper will demonstrate how political
economy can be used to analyse and study the phenomena that take place
within the field of communication.
A political economy approach to communication was influenced by the-changes
that began to take place in the press industry, electronic media and
telecommunications. In the past these modest enterprises were often family-
owned but later transformed into major corporations (Mosco, 1996). The
challenge for early political economists was of describing the practices and
structures of these large corporations, and even more importantly, looking into
the implications of the possession of substantial power by these enterprises. The
question of how much power is in the hands of those who own media companies
and how this can influence society is a major question still dealt with by
researchers and academics today. This particular issue will be dealt with in
greater detail further on in this section.
According to Philip Graham3 political economy of communication has its roots in
the concept of 'knowledge monopolies'; a concept developed by Canadian
economist Harold Innis (1942, 1944, 1950, 1951a, 1951b). 'Knowledge
monopolies' is a concept based on the notion that throughout history certain
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privileged groups such as priests, kings, bureaucrats and scientists have enjoyed
exclusive access to certain kinds of knowledge. Other contributors to the
development of the field of study are Horkheimer and Adorno (1947/1998)
particularly with their essay on the 'culture industry' which continues to be of
great relevance even today.
Initially, the political economy approach tended to focus more on production
through the examination of the growth of the communication industry. As the
industry grew and these products were being consumed on an increasingly mass
scale, political economists began looking at other aspects, such as social
relations and the organisation of consumption. They began seeing the growth in
consumption as a "structural response to the economic crisis of overproduction
and as a social response to the political crisis" (Mosco, 1996: 74). In essence
they began grappling with the changes that were taking place in a more holistic
manner. Political economy also began looking at the state's role as a producer,
distributor, consumer and regulator of communication. This was a crucial step
because the involvement of the state in such a way was to be treated with great
scepticism as the state was considered, generally by political economists as
inhibitive with regards to economic activity. Based on examples in history, the
state has always taken a keen interest in telecommunications and broadcasting
technologies. In the United States, Britain and South Africa, to name a few, when
radio first emerged, the state was very quick to adopt the responsibility of
regulation and in certain cases outright control over the industry. This occurrence
reiterates the observation made by Innis (1942,1944,1950, 1951a, 1951b) in his
conception of knowledge monopolies.
During the early development of political economy, there was a preoccupation
with supporting social movements for public access and control of media
institutions. The reality of state-owned media institutions was not very pleasing to
theorists of this paradigm and were therefore advocating privatisation. As the
3http://www.philgraham.netlMME%20Chapter_Final.pdf
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trend of privatisation and deregulation gained momentum however, it became
more and more apparent that privatisation was creating disparities in terms of
access and content that seemed to promote government propaganda, was now
largely reflecting market pressures. The communication industry was moving
from one form of control to another, instead of being controlled by the state it was
increasingly being controlled by market demands and capitalist objectives.
A further issue that became of particular interest to political economists, with all
the changes that were taking place, particularly the expansion of the industry,
was media imperialism. This arose from the fact that media products were now
being exported to other countries and the concern was that the direction of flow
was particularly from the developed to the developing or underdeveloped
countries. This unequal economic relationship raised concerns because media
products are also cultural products and this constant consumption of foreign
culture by the developing world could lead to cultural imperialism. In an effort to
minimise this imbalance and the consequential effects of it thereof, concerned
groups and organisations got together and the New World Information and
Communication Order (NWICO) was formed (McQuail 2000; Fourie 2001; Doyle
2002). The problems briefly discussed above are just some of the factors that
motivated the development of the political economy of communication industry.
The analysis of the communication industry through the political economy
approach posed a number of challenges for its theorists. Some of the
fundamental concepts did not seem to be suitable or capable of dealing with
some of the problems that arose out of the ever expanding industry and as a
result there was constant need to look for alternatives. The neoclassical
approach for example was considered by some, including Vincent Mosco, to be
"particularly unsuited to the analysis of the communication industry because most
of its fundamental characteristics occupy the area that neoclassical economics
reserves for exceptional cases (Mosco, 1996: 77). For example the fact that a
news broadcast was not used up in the process of consumption lent ambiguity to
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its treatment under orthodox economic approaches (Mosco, 1996). One of the
problems presented by the communtcation industry was that there was
uncertainty about the nature of the primary commodity because the industry was
in the market for both programming and audiences, both rather unconventional in
nature. Mosco (1996) focuses more on social change, social process and social
relations whereas the focus previously had been more on structures and
institutions. He does this by developing a map of political economy using three
main entry points; commodification, spatialisation and structuration.
Commodification
Commodification can be described as a process whereby use values are
transformed into exchange values, (cf. Marx and Engels 1848) in other words
"transforming products whose value is determined by their ability to meet
individual and social needs into products whose value is set by what they can
bring in the marketplace" (Mosco, 1996: 143). Another source defines
commodification as "the transformation of a non-commodity into a commodity, to
assign a monetary value to something that traditionally would not be considered
in monetary terms, for example, an idea, identity, gender." One could consider for
example, a subsistence and a commercial farmer to illustrate this point. A
subsistence farmer grows vegetables and keeps livestock to feed his family and
so he does not produce on a large scale. His vegetables and livestock are
therefore useful to him in the sense that his family's needs are satisfied in terms
of nutritional sustenance. On the other hand a commercial farmer will grow
vegetables on a much larger scale and when they are ready; he harvests and
sells them to retailers for a profit. The vegetables have therefore transformed, in
terms of value from being useful to the individual, as in the case of the
subsistence farmer, to being valuable in the sense that they can be exchanged
for something else, money. So the process of producing and exchanging objects
for money is commodification.
The process of commodification is a fundamental aspect of capitalism because it
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allows for the continued accumulation of wealth. Without commodification,
capitalism cannot exist because it is through producing and selling products,
transforming from use value to exchange value, that the accumulation of wealth
takes place. The communication industry like any other is a capitalist one and
therefore also goes through the processes of commodification. The most obvious
commodity in the communications industry is the content. The commodification of
media content is basically the transformation of pieces of information into
marketable products. A newspaper (a commodity) for example is made up of
numerous pieces of information called news that have been written and edited by
journalists and editors. This newspaper is then sold in the marketplace to make a
profit. The distinguishing factor about the media commodity however, is that over
and above its ability to generate profit, it also contains textual messages which
can influence or shape the thoughts of its consumers. This is a crucial point
because it therefore suggests to an extent that he who controls what the people
read, hear and see via media products, controls what they think about and
perhaps even how. Media ownership and control is as a result, a major concern
for regulators.
The other commodity in communications is the audience and according to Dallas
Smythe (1977) the audience is the primary commodity of mass media. Smythe
was the first to popularize the insight that the programmes created primarily are
for the purpose of attracting audiences so as to deliver them to advertisers. In
other words advertisers will pay for their adverts to be broadcast when they are
guaranteed a large audience, for example sitting in front of their television sets.
The only way to attract large audiences at a particular time is dependent on
convenience of course but also on the provision of popular programming. In the
case of newspapers, advertisers are mainly interested in acquiring space to
advertise on newspapers they know are read by a substantial amount of people.
Smythe's views therefore shift the emphasis from the whole notion of the media
industry being about creating ideologically saturated material as its main
objective towards it being about constructing audiences. The significance of the
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audience commodity is expressed by Mosco (1996: 149) when he states that:
The process of commodification thoroughly integrates the media industries
into the capitalist economy not primarily by creating ideologically saturated
products but by producing audiences en masse and in specific
demographically desirable forms for advertisers.
According to Eileen Meehan (1984) however, the primary commodity is not the
audience itself but the audience ratings. She believes that since it is only the
ratings that are exchanged and not the messages or the audiences, they are the
primary commodity. Such information (ratings) is used in the improvement of the
commodification of content. It is through such information that content,
advertisements included, are tailor made to suit a particular audience group and
as such are referred to by Mosco as cybernetic commodities. There are
numerous factors that constitute the commodity and the process itself in the
media industry.
Commodification has made such an impact that this process "has been extended
to institutional areas such as public education, government information, media,
culture and telecommunication that were certainly created out of a range of
contested forces and motives, but which nevertheless preserved principles of
universal access... " (Mosco, 1996: 153). The extension of commodification to
such areas has been influenced by the decline in economic growth and the shift
in political power towards the conservative right. As a result of this, institutions
that provided services based on the principles of universality, equality and social
participation are "increasingly reduced to a market logic that equates rights with
market power" (Mosco, 1996: 154). This explains in part Why public broadcasters
are finding it increasingly difficult to function.
Finally, Mosco argues that the success of commodification can be attributed to
the way in which political and economic power has been used in this regard.
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Commodification is perceived as the natural order and thus a basic reality of
social life, instead of as a process of power.
Spatialization
Spatialization has been referred to by Henri Lefebvre as the process of
overcoming the constraints of space and time in social life (Henri Lefebvre,
1979). This has been made possible generally through the rapid development of
technology. A basic example of how time and space have been overcome is
through the development of the aircraft. Before the aircraft it would take travellers
months in certain cases to journey from one country to another but now it's a
matter of hours. In terms of communications one could consider the example of
satellite technology in that it allows people to witness live events taking place in
other countries, in the comfort of their own homes. In this regard, both time and
space are made insignificant. Spatialization is a significant factor in the
communications industry in that it impacts on the production, distribution and
location of media companies or institutions. Due to spatialization it is now
possible for a media company to produce the same media product, for example a
magazine, in a number of different countries, with the necessary modifications in
terms of language, all at the same time (Doyle 2002). Distribution channels have
also become extremely efficient with technological advancements in the
transportation industry such as the aircraft. As a result of these factors it is
becoming less and less important where a company is based and this can
enhance the effects of media imperialism for example. Communication studies
and spatialization, otherwise referred to as time-space distanciation or time-
space convergence (Baudrillard 1988; Giddens1984), are inextricably linked
because communication technologies play a major role in overcoming time and
space constraints, as in the example of satellite communication. What is of
crucial importance though, is the question of; to what extent has spatialization
impacted on the media industry and has it been positive or negative?
The political economy of communication addresses spatialization chiefly in terms
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of the way in which it enhances corporate power in the communication industry
(Mosco, 1996). The enOimous growth of media companies due to spatialization
has increased the level of concern among academics, regulators and other social
movements. This is the case because such growth can lead to concentration and
in extreme cases monopolization, which invariably leads to fewer information
sources. There are still disagreements however on the concepts of concentration
and the extent to which they impact either positively or negatively on society.
Structuration
Structuration theory was founded by Anthony Giddens and through this theory he
proposes an alternative conception of the notion of structure to that of
functionalism and even structuralism as he feels that neither of these conceptions
are adequate for the demands of social theory (Giddens, 1982; 1984). The
primary suggestion made by Giddens is that "the rules and resources [structure]
drawn upon in the production and reproduction of social action are at the same
time the means of system reproduction (1984:19). This suggests that structures
exist as a result of human agency, but they also form the basis of their own
creation and this is what he refers to as the duality of structure. Mosco (1996:
212) further explains by stating that "[S]ocial life is comprised of the mutual
constitution of structure and agency". Structure and agency are therefore
inextricably connected.
The relevance of structuration to this discussion lies in the fact that it is an
"approach to social life that aims to address goal-oriented, reflexive human
action, without giving up on understanding the 'sutures' of power that mutually
constitute social action" (Mosco,1996: 213). The attempt to regulate the media
industry is a goal-oriented, reflexive action. It is supposed to address or rectify
certain problems that exist in the media industry. Unfortunately there are forces
that make it difficult to achieve this goal. One could therefore see within the
context of the communication industry agency as the formulation and
implementation of regulation policies and the structure as capitalism. In the
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conception of structuration, it is therefore important not to make the mistake of
emphasising human agency (regulatory policies) over structure
(capitalism/market forces), because as shall be further demonstrated, market
forces can be extremely difficult to overcome, regardless of how determined
regulators may be. The emphasis of agency over structure results in a
conception of structuration that neglects to acknowledge the presence of power.
In the communications industry companies have been able to accumulate
enough power to significantly increase the production of media and information
commodities and even influence government regulatory policies. Structuration in
this sense expands on this idea of power by examining how it operates at a
micro-level. This process demands that one examine, for example the decisions
a major company takes when deciding which company to acquire or with whom
an investment should be made. Mosco (1996: 214) suggests that there is a
tendency to explain or justify such decisions by reducing them down to a
question of profit maximisation, "when there's in actual fact a set of micro-power
struggles that can grow out of narrow interests of specific executives or board
members". This is a crucial point because it suggests that when a company has
accrued enough power, certain members of its board or executives can use the
company to achieve personal goals or interests that may not necessarily be in
the best interests of industry or society at large. Studying the impact of power at
a micro-level requires the consideration of the social aspect as well. When
dealing with the question of power and the role it plays in the equation of
structure and agency, it is essential to consider that "[A]gency is a fundamentally
social conception that refers to individuals as social actors whose behaviour is
constituted out of their matrix of social relations and positioning, including class,
race and gender" (Mosco, 1996: 215).
Social class within the conception of structuration allows one to examine the
mutual constitution of agency and structure on a social level. Social class is a
categorical construction that defines a category of people based on their
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economic standing measured by wealth/income. By studying social class one
begins to uncover other vital factors, such as how media elites continue to
produce and reproduce ideologies that justify or naturalise their control and
power. Other studies of social class, within the political economy of
communication framework focus on how class rule takes place within the process
of policy formulation and regulation. These studies on social class help towards
understanding the way in which the process of elite rule and consequentially the
marginalisation of lower classes is structured. Within communications class
structure is important in terms of the relationship of social class to access to
communication commodities (Garnham 1990). Due to the increased
commercialization and privatization of public institutions such as public service
communication systems and the gradual reduction of social service education
and health care budgets, economic factors have become more significant in
determining access to services, including communication. "There is a clear
correspondence between income and the likelihood of a personal computer in the
home" (Mosco, 1996: 219). In the United States of America during the 1980's,
funding for public broadcasting was gradually eroded and the system was forced
to rely on corporate support. As a result public broadcasting became increasingly
commercialised and also "came to embrace the programming interests of those
class constituencies that took up more of the funding responsibility" (Mosco,
1996: 219).
Based on the concepts and issues discussed above, it is evident that there are a
number of major problems and issues that need to be taken into consideration
when formulating and implementing media policies, whether one is arguing for a
free market system or state regulation. The regulation of the communications
industry, as a result of increased commodification, spatialization and structuration
has become an extremely complex task. There are a number of arguments and
issues to consider especially when operating within a democratic dispensation
where fairness and equality are key components. Media ownership and control
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and the accompanying consequences are key issues in the regulation debate as
well. The next section will discuss issues surrounding media ownership and
control, such as the question of pluralism and how this can be affected by media
concentration, but will begin with a brief discussion of some of the ideological
beliefs that underpin some of the broadcasting policies we see today.
Chapter two
Conceptions of Social Communication (Broadcasting)
Kenneth Dyson et al (1988: 64), notes three basic conceptions of social
communications (broadcasting) that constitute the ideological backgrounds that
inform broadcasting policies and they are:
social communications as the protection of good taste; social
communications as the distribution of information and the sharing of
experience according to individual preference and personal choice; and
social communications as distribution and sharing of information and
experience according to need.
The conception of social communications as the protection of good taste
fundamentally is conservative in that it is aimed at maintaining or preserving the
social order from any form of disruption. This conception is also based on the
idea that good taste is represented by traditional values and norms and not the
expression of people's wants and desires. There will therefore be a difference
between a person's sense of good taste and this "depends upon mental
cultivation, an exposure to the best in the tradition of his society" (Dyson et ai,
1988: 65-66) and his preferences, as these are derived from the individual's
personal interests. An individual might think it important and in good taste to
watch informative documentaries and programmes dealing with current affairs
and yet end up watching action movies and soap operas. One can immediately
see the conflict between a conservative conception of social communications and
the conception of social communications as individual preference. The third
conception of social communications demands that programmes be produced
and distributed according to basic human needs. Educational programmes, for
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example, can be considered as a need because without education and
knowledge, people may be disadvantaged and as a result may be inhibited in
terms of self-development. Within the context of this conception of social
communications, "[B]roadcasting is seen as remedying some deficiency of
knowledge or experience" (Dyson et ai, 1988: 66). This conception of social
communications conflicts with the others in a sense that what may be considered
as being in good taste may not necessarily be what an individual needs, the
same applies between what an individual needs and what an individual wants.
One could consider for example a Grade 12 student who, towards his or her final
exams may choose to watch movies over the learning channel on SABC
television where school work is revised.
The ideas or notions of what social communications should or should not be are
based on wider social perspectives and each of the three conceptions of social
communications mentioned above, each fall under a correlative set of
assumptions about how society should function. These sets of assumptions can
be referred to as social models and they represent society either as a hierarchical
order, as a competitive market or as a cooperative community. The first model
considers society as being divided into vertical ranks with those occupying the
highest positions being in possession of the largest portion of cultural excellence
and good taste (Dyson et ai, 1988). Within the context of this model, these
people have the responsibility of protecting the hierarchy of ascending good
taste. This model also displays very little faith in human nature, as it holds the
view that without any form of prevention, anarchy would prevail due to
competitive individualism. This model, like the notion of social communications as
being responsible for the protection of good taste, can be said to be elitist as it
supports and suits those already in a position of power and high class and
therefore advocates for the maintenance or preservation of the status quo.
The second model views society as a competitive market. In this context, there is
no fixed social order, individuals are independent and free to act in their own best
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interests, within certain boundaries of course. Based on this model the
responsibility of social communications lies in responding to the variety of
interests in the society. Here the view of human nature is more positive and the
individual becomes a "source of economic activity by his enterprise and
innovation" (Dyson et ai, 1988: 68). This model correlates with the conception of
social communications as the distribution of information and the sharing of
experience according to individual preference and personal choice, with a free
market system where the industry is left to regulate itself.
The third model views society as a cooperative community and is based on the
idea that the individuals of a particular society are bound together by mutual
dependence. Society is viewed as an embodiment of relationships amongst
diverse social groupings and individuals with unique experiences. In this context,
social communications then becomes responsible for bringing these diverse
groups, cultures and individuals together to form some kind of common culture.
This model supports the conception of- social communications as distribution of
information and experience according to need. Some of the programming on
SABC has been illustrative of this idea through programmes like Suburban Bliss
(cf.Roome,1998), where a black family moves from the townships to the suburbs.
Upon their arrival, they begin to encounter challenges as they try to co-exist with
their white neighbours. Ultimately, they do find a way to co-exist through learning
to be more tolerant of each other's cultures and habits and as a result come to
embody the proverbial 'rainbow' nation, the common culture. There is also the
placement of emphasis on the importance of equal status between the
broadcaster and the viewer in order to promote, through the broadcasting
policies, equal access and participation. This model has socially motivated
objectives, underpinned by democratic principles.
Some of the work that best encapsulates the fundamental principles of this model
and how it supports the conception of social communications as distribution of
information according to need is that of Raymond Williams. Williams, in this
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regard was inspired by a colleague of his by the name of F.R Leavis, who had as
central themes to his work, cultural disintegration and a need for the restoration
of the traditional values of organic communities. Leavis was opposed to a
commercially oriented conception of social communications as he believed that it
could only generate a 'clever', trivial and feckless culture (Leavis, 1964). Not to
be mistaken as being too conservative, he was very critical of ruling class culture
and of the "pretentiousness of its mere cultivation" (Dyson et ai, 1988: 79). Leavis
believed in a society whose culture embraced and was deeply rooted in the
community, it had to be a community that conveyed vivid life, "Culture was not
regarded as a gift from natural superiors to natural inferiors, or such as are
capable of receiving it" (Dyson, 1988: 79).
Williams believed that social communications should embrace more and more
people and should not be restricted to catering for only the elite. Social
communications was also to be a-platform for open discussion.
The central purpose of social communications was, accordingly, to
recover 'a knowable community', one that was not exploitative but that
was based on the humanistic concept of social use rather than the
mechanical concept of the market (Dyson et al: 80).
In essence the commodification of social communications was seen to be limiting
and suppressive of other areas of human experience and relationships. Williams
further makes the point that unfortunately most of the cultural institutions are in
the hands of speculators whose only interest is not the health and growth of
society but the generation of quick profits. Social communications is not only
meant to include all sectors of society but should also be educational.
Broadcasting should involve "the provision of an outlet for the diversity of social
forces and the illumination of the struggles and contradictions at the heart of
society" (Dyson et ai, 1988: 81). For such an interaction to take place, it would be
of vital importance to have flexible and open structures of ownership and control
in broadcasting.
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It is quite evident that conceptions of social communications are mainly based on
ideological beliefs of how societies should function and each model has its merits
and flaws. The question is; which is most acceptable? In certain eras or periods
one is considered more acceptable than the other depending on what stance is
taken by those in power at a given time. To illustrate this point, consider the first
director-general of the British Broadcasting Commission (BBC), Lord John Reith.
It could be said that John Reith saw society as a hierarchical order, and as a
result, subscribed to the idea of social communications as being responsible for
the protection of good taste and the avoidance of anarchic behaviour. Lord Reith
considered broadcasting as having a civilising mission and therefore believed
that "broadcasters had a moral duty to use radio as an instrument of
enlightenment" (James McDonnel, 1992: 02). The task of broadcasting also
became the protection of the social order by holding up high the ideal of cultural
excellence (Dyson et ai, 1988). One of the ways in which attempts were made at
preserving cultural excellence was through the transmission of classical music
programmes. In light of this Reith found it essential for broadcasting to be
assigned through and regulated by the state (Teer-Tomaselli, 2005). Such an
arrangement would help ensure that the broadcaster maintained a sense of
moral obligation, a public service motive, assured finance and monopoly status,
which is what Reith felt were the makings of a good broadcaster.
Reith's conservative ideas however could not remain popular and dominant
indefinitely due to the social changes that were taking place. Commercialism was
increasingly becoming the norm, particularly with the rise of the commercial press
and commercial cinema. More popular music began playing on BBC radio. The
1950's consumer boom led to the establishment of Independent Television (ITV)
in 1954 and as a result there was intense competition for ratings, in other words
competition to get the most viewers. Due to this competition it was the taste of
the general audience that determined broadcasting content and not so much the
importance of upholding good taste. This does not however mean that such
principles were abandoned; there was just a little less evidence of their
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implementation. Lord Reith's views of how society should function determined the
way in which the BBC functioned during his term as director general, and even
after. This was the case because his views were not significantly challenged and
were then taken for granted as the natural order. This is how and what influences
regulatory policies, if the dominant views within a particular society are of an
autocratic nature, then the policies regulating the media will naturally be the
same.
Views opposing elitist programming however, began to emerge in the 1950s and
1960s. With the success of the commercial television lobby in 1954 and later,
that of the local commercial radio lobby in 1971, more and more people began
challenging the view of broadcasting as a protector of good taste and supporting
a more market orientated conception of broadcasting (Coli ins, 1987). The first
director general of the Independent Television Authority (ITA), Sir Robert Fraser,
supported the idea of a p-eople's television. This was a system where popular
pleasures and interests would be the guiding principle. It was Fraser's conviction
that the structure and content of broadcasting should no longer be determined by
"rigid institutions that offered a restricted diet of morally and intellectually
nourishing programmes" (Dyson et ai, 1988: 74). Following this outlook towards
broadcasting, the Institute of Economic Affairs (lEA) offered a model based on
market forces derived from the model of social communications as the
satisfaction of individual preferences. In this context broadcasting was seen as a
transaction between the viewer and the broadcaster and no longer as a public
good. This model is epitomised by pay-per-view or subscription television, where
the content providers rely primarily on subscription fees to bring the viewers high
quality entertainment. This form of broadcasting is epitomised, today in South
Africa, by Electronic Media Network (M-Net) and Digital Satellite Television
(DSTV). The high subscription fees of such broadcasting make 'it difficult for a
significant portion of the South African population to gain access to such
entertainment. Such services would only be accessible, mostly to people in the
middle and upper income class groups. This model of social communications is
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constituted by the view that consumer choice should determine content and also
by the belief that a market model would result in more pluralism by removing the
concentration of power from broadcasters easily influenced by government. It
was hoped that this could be achieved by making it easier for new content
providers to enter the market.
Despite Lord Reith's views that in order for a broadcaster to function
successfully, it has to have a monopoly status, today it is generally accepted that
a monopoly is harmful to broadcasting as it may inhibit diversity/pluralism. This
seems to be one of the points that the models of society as a market system and
society as co-operative community agree on. The concern and preoccupation
with the issue of ownership and control of the media is not a recent occurrence.
The following section will now discuss ownership and control with regards to
pluralism/diversity.
Ownership and Control
One of the reasons as to why the ownership and control of the media is of such
major concern is because of the profound influence it is thought to have on the
socio-cultural, economic and political lives of the individuals of a society. This
perceived power of the media therefore means that he/she who controls the
media can influence society in a number of crucial ways and if this power is used
irresponsibly the consequences could be for example the repression of certain
sectors of society. One could act irresponsibly through the abuse of political
power or the under-representation of some significant viewpoints. It is therefore
believed that media concentration narrows the scope or the range of voices that
participate in the media and as a result pose a threat to the interests of society
(Aufderheide, 1994; Doyle, 2002). This suggests therefore that the solution to
ensuring that no single voice dominates the media platform is to put in place
measures that will promote pluralism and diversity. Based on this idea it becomes
clear that one of the principle functions of any regulator particularly in
broadcasting should be to implement and enforce policies that curb media
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concentration while at the same time promoting pluralism.
Pluralism can be defined as "... the presence of a number of different and
independent voices, and of differing political opinions and representations of
culture within the media." (Doyle, 2002: 11). In other words there must be variety
within the media. This suggests the avoidance of a situation whereby one
particular voice, political opinion or culture dominates broadcast channels. Within
a democratic society this only makes sense because democracy is characterised
by, among others, principles of fairness and equality but even more importantly
the concept of freedom of speech.
A European organisation concerned with the escalating concentration of media
and its effects, the MM-CM (Committee of Experts on Media Concentrations and
Pluralism) focuses on a slightly different aspect: "Media pluralism should be
understood as diversity of media supply, reflected, for example, in the existence
of a plurality of independent and autonomous media and a diversity of media
contents available to the public" (Doyle, 2002: 12). This definition introduces the
idea of not only having variety in terms of media content but also in terms of
suppliers. So, according to this definition it is not enough to have for example one
company that promises to represent all the different cultural denominations,
political parties and opinions. There must be a number of different companies
representing a number of different aspects of that particular society.
According to Jan Van Cuilenburg (1998: 72) however, "Media diversity refers to
media content: media diversity is heterogeneity of media content in terms of one
or more specified characteristics." He goes on to say that this definition tries not
to equate the diversity of suppliers with content diversity because:
Highly competitive media markets may still result in excessive sameness
of media contents, whereas one should at least theoretically not exclude
the possibility of media oligopolies or even monopolies to produce a
highly diverse supply of media content (Van Cuilenburg, 1998: 72).
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This view makes the argument for regulation that much more challenging
because while regulators justify their intentions of minimising the formation of
monopolies by saying that they threaten pluralism, it could be that these very
same monopolistic structures are the best way in which pluralism can be
provided for. This sentiment is enforced by Gillian Doyle (2002: 13) when she
says:
Higher levels of market domination mean fewer competing suppliers;
fewer competing suppliers imply a more cost-effective use of resources;
the availability of more resources for innovation implies an increased
range of output; more diverse output implies greater pluralism.
Based on this point, how can regulators justify their insistence on standing in
opposition to media concentration, if it is possible that this very concentration can
enhance pluralism as explained by Doyle above? Thomas Gibbons notes that
"Generally, the free speech principle supports a presumption that the democratic
interests of both speakers and audiences are best served by not regulating the
media, either through restraints over content or by special controls over
economic arrangements" (2000: 305). It has been argued that in this way greater
opportunities are provided for encouraging a free flow of information and opinion.
However there are two major reasons that suggest that the opposite may be true.
One reason is that:
Freedom of speech itself entails that a basic amount of information
should be available - for speakers to speak about. On this view, a right
to be informed is considered necessary to enhance the worth of any
speaker's statements and is regarded as justifying some restriction on
media content if that makes room for a wider variety of fact and opinion
(Gibbons, 2000: 305).
Secondly, pluralism may actually advance one of the objectives that the free
speech principle aims to secure which is democratic discussion and participation
in order to ensure that the audience can choose freely from a wide variety of
sources.
The answer also lies in the fact that although it is theoretically possible for
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oligopolistic and monopolistic companies to provide programming that is diverse,
there are numerous examples where media moguls and in some cases the
government have lost sight of society's interests and furthered more personal
goals. So it cannot be taken for granted that media moguls, especially if they
have no major competition, will take it upon themselves to innovate and increase
the range of output for the benefit of society, when there are tried and tested
methods of maximising profits, which do not always have society's best interests
at heart. This point does, however suggest that when discussing pluralism, one
should not simply rule monopolies out as totally destructive since the debate is
more complex than that.
Gibbons makes a distinction between two different forms of pluralism; external
and internal. External pluralism refers to diversity in media supply as suggested
by the MM-CM. "This means that such material is supplied by a variety of
programme or information producers, editors or owners" (Gibbons, 2000: 306).
External pluralism can therefore be achieved through the creation of structural
safeguards which prohibit for example one company from merging with another if
it is considered to be already in control of a significant portion of the market.
Internal pluralism on the other hand refers more directly to the plurality of content
where the substance of each media outlet's material is required to reflect a range
of opinions and subject matter. This distinction by Gibbons assists in the
understanding of pluralism as, at the very least, a two dimensional concept rather
than a single one. This therefore suggests that focussing on only trying to
increase the number of suppliers within a specific market for example would not
be sufficiently effective. One would have to address both dimensions and ensure
that there are also rules in place that promote content diversity.
The concept of pluralism could be perceived simply as an ideal as it tries to
ensure equality and fairness but with questionable feasibility. This is the case
because although "the standard rationale is that the media are just giving people
what they want, it is more the case that the media are giving advertisers what
their corporate customers want" (O'Brien, 1998: 04). The media industry is like
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any other when it comes to economics because the purpose of any company,
including media firms, is to generate as much profit as possible. The idea of
pluralism however doesn't exactly enhance this objective. Pluralism means there
must be diversity in terms of content, but media firms tend to cater more for those
that will result in a substantial income and neglects those that don't promise to be
economically viable. Television broadcasting firms for example rely heavily on the
income they receive from advertisers. Advertisers wiH only advertise on channels
they know will be watched by the most number of people they are pitching their
products to. So these are of course people who would be capable, first of all, of
buying the products on offer and secondly these are people that fall into some
significant population group. So ultimately one could say that it's the advertisers
who determine what programmes should be broadcast, "Procter and Gamble, the
world's number one advertiser explicitly prohibits programming which could in
any way further the concept of business as cold, ruthless and lacking all
sentiment or spiritual motivation" (Herman and McChesney, 1997: 7). So a
program_me wanting to expose, for example the exploitation of a group of people
in the manufacture of a certain product, could end up not making its way to the
television screen because Procter and Gamble and many other companies alike
would not want to be associated with such a programme. This is but a basic
example of some of the forces that are at work within the industry and it is clear
how they can make pluralism difficult to achieve. The point being made here
ultimately is that it can be extremely expensive yet not very profitable to cater for
the interests of a minority group as articulately illustrated by Jean-Claude
Burgelman (1997: 128):
It is also much more difficult to realize a return on investment when a
programme is made for an audience of 6 million people, in a language that
few understand (and thus needs dubbing, extra promotion, etc, to be
exported), than when the same is done for an audience of 50 million.
In a society where the media industry operates within a free market system; it
seems that the only people who would get representation in the media are the
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affluent and those who form a significant part of the population, although this may
not necessarily always be the case.
It can be argued that pluralism with regards to media content or content diversity
is threatened, broadly speaking, by the pursuit of increased profit margins
explained through concepts of commodification and spatialization. There are
however other constitutive elements that may have an impact on pluralism such
as the size/wealth of the market, diversity of suppliers, consolidation of resources
and diversity of output.
Doyle (2002: 15) mentions that in a free market economy "the level of resources
available for the provision of media will be constrained principally by the size and
wealth of that economy, and the propensity of its inhabitants to consume media".
In essence, the size and wealth of the economy will determine the level of
resources. so if the economy is relatively small. then the chances are that the
level of resources will only allow for a limited level of pluralism in terms of media
output. This also suggests that the number of media content providers will be
limited because a small market simply cannot support many suppliers. It
therefore follows logically then that the larger and wealthier the market, the
greater the resources available for the provision of media, which means that such
markets can afford to provide for diverse media output. Since a larger market can
support many media suppliers, the size of their audiences will be large enough to
stimulate audience segmentation practices, resulting in a situation whereby
minorities are also catered for (Doyle, 2002).
The diversity of suppliers is a crucial component of pluralism. The basic notion is
that if there are many independent suppliers of media products, then there will be
a diverse range of content output. Of course this may not necessarily be the
case; it is quite possible to find a situation whereby there are a number of
different suppliers all producing more or less the same media products. Although
this may be the case, there is a greater chance of witnessing greater pluralism in
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the media if there are a number of independent suppliers rather than in a
monopolistic situation. The lack of diversity of media suppliers can lead to a
narrowing in the diversity of political opinions available as in the case of Silvio
Brerlusconi, who used his three television stations, which reached 40 percent of
the Italian audience, to promote his own political party in Italy during the 1994
March elections (Bagdidkian, 1992; Graham and Davies, 1997).
Another crucial factor that can exert some level of influence over pluralism, is the
consolidation of resources. This basically refers to how the resources that are
available for media provision are actually managed. The way in which the
resources are managed depends, to some extent, on the decisions made at the
political level in terms of how much should be kept for public use and how much
can be sold off to private companies for example (Stephen and Law, 1988). In a
free market system however, decisions on how resources will be managed are
primarily the prerogative of the market players. In an enabling market, the
tendency would be for companies to merge because "the more homogeneity
possible between different services held in common ownership (or the more
elements within a programme schedule which can be shared between 'different'
stations), the greater the opportunity to reap economies" (Doyle, 2002: 23). The
effect of the consolidation of resources depends on whether the purpose is to
strengthen the market share of existing media products or whether it is used to
support the production of new and innovative products. Of course if the purpose
is to achieve the former, then pluralism is negatively affected, if however it is the
latter, then pluralism is enhanced.
The diversity of output is a crucial aspect of political and cultural pluralism. It is
therefore important that the content produced even though it is by different
companies is not standardised, it must be diverse in nature. The existence of a
number of different political voices in the media is important. The representation
of the different cultures of a society must be evident in the programming, even if
doing so may not initially be economically viable. This is where the problem
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arises within a free market system, because the chances of providing for such
programming are highly unlikely because few companies, if any would be willing
to broadcast a programme that wasn't economically viable. With public service
broadcasting, however, it is the responsibility of the broadcaster to ensure that all
sectors of society are culturally represented and that all political voices are given
a platform (Curran, 1979).
The preceding sections have briefly discussed mainly two types of theories and
concepts; those that seek to explain certain phenomena that take place within in
the media industry and those that can be applied in order to resolve any
undesirable occurrences. The study will now take a historical look at the
broadcasting industry mainly the British and South African as the objective is to
ultimately draw parallels between the systems in both countries looking at both
function and regulation.
Chapter three
Early Regulation of Broadcast Media
The example of the United Kingdom and the United States
Broadcast regulation has existed almost as long as the medium itself for
numerous reasons. It has however been under a constant state of evolution since
its conception. Over the years and with the changes of political ideologies that
arise with each era, ideas on the regulation of broadcasting have been
transformed to conform to the reigning ideologies of a society. This section of the
dissertation will give a brief historical account of the advent of broadcasting and
the attempts to regulate it.
Broadcasting began with the development of radio in the early 1920s. With this
development came the automatic intervention by the government because it was
seen as a potential threat to national security. It was feared that amateurs making
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their own receivers could intercept certain messages being sent through the
airwaves by military officers and thus jeopardise national security.
In Britain the government had a tight grip on new technologies in that the
Telegraphy Act of 1869, for example gave the post office the exclusive right to
transmit telegrams within the United Kingdom and the post office was a
government department. A further Act of 1904 gave the Postmaster General
control of wireless telegraphy, and when wireless telephony developed, he
regarded that too as subject to his control.
When the first Great War ended in 1918 it became difficult for the British
government to justify their stance against the transmission of a regular kind of
service for the general public on military grounds. As a result in 1920, the Post
Office permitted "the Marconi Company to make broadcasts from its transmitter
at Writtle near Chelmsford, but was instructed to avoid encroaching on the secret
point-ta-point transmissions of the armed forces" (Crissell, 1997:13). This is
exemplary of early forms of basic regulation, where the government simply
assumed control and determined how the medium was to be used.
Due to complaints stemming from the view that "this use for entertainment of
what was primarily a commercial and transport control medium was frivolous and
dangerous" (Williams, 1974: 32), the Marconi Company was banned temporarily
and it was not until in 1922 that they along with other companies began regular
broadcasts. These companies were however not permitted licences on a
permanent basis by the Post office as it did not want to deny other companies
access to a limited number of frequencies in the future.
In the United States of America, the only two laws dealing with radio were the
Wireless Ship Act of 1910 and the Radio Act of 1912. Both of these primarily
regulated ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship maritime communications (Krasnow,
Longley and Terry, 1982). With the emergence of broadcasting in the 1920's, the
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then secretary of commerce, Herbert Hoover attempted to use the 1912 Act as a
statutory basis for regulation of broadcaster's use of frequencies. In 1921 he
designated 833 kilohertz as the frequency of broadcasting and in 1922 added
750 kilohertz as a second broadcast frequency. Soon realising that the previous
laws were not enough to deal with the rapidly growing and increasingly complex
industry, he called for a broadcaster conference in 1922 "to discuss ways of
controlling the use of these radio frequencies" (Krasnow et ai, 1982: 11). The
main concern at the time was to formulate some form of regulatory policy that
would assist in the orderly allocation of frequencies. Two months after the
conference had been convened, it was decided that self-regulation would not be
the ideal course to take and as a result recommendations were made, stating
that legislation authorising government control over the allocation, assignment
and use of broadcast frequencies be passed.
The first conference did not make much of a difference in terms of the operation
of broadcasters and as a result, Hoover called for a second conference in 1923
to determine ways that would lead to the reduction of radio reception interference
caused by the crowding of stations. Despite continued attempts by Hoover to
remedy the situation, the problem of frequency crowding persisted. Eventually in
1926 a court ruling deprived him of any authority to regulate radio frequencies,
power or hours of operation (Collins, 1990).
Due to the lack of an official regulator, by 1926 the chaotic conditions had
become more pronounced and strong demands began coming from the public
and the radio industry for congress to take action. Taking action proved rather
difficult because "despite having held several hearings, the House and the
Senate had been unable to agree on basic points about who would regulate
radio" (Krasnow et ai, 1982: 12). The House on the one hand was in favour of the
secretary of commerce to retain the authority to issue out licences and on the
other hand the senate thought it better to establish a permanent and more
independent radio commission. Senator Clarence C. Dillot Washington,
33
Chairman of the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, argued that the
influence of radio on the social, political and economic life of the American people
and the complex problems of its administration "demand that Congress establish
an entirely independent body to take charge of the regulation of radio
communications in all its forms" (Krasnow et ai, 1982: 12). After much debate on
which course to take regarding regulation, the Radio Act of 1927 came into
existence and it reflected a compromise on both sides. There was a division of
responsibilities between the secretary of commerce and the new Federal Radio
Commission.
The way in which government, in particular the British, was anxious to gain
control of radio broadcasting and have exclusive access to it is demonstrative of
Harold Innis' notion of knowledge monopolies. The government saw it best to
monopolise radio as they foresaw the potential it had in terms of effective
transmission of information Classical politicaL economy immediately raises
concerns and explanations as to why such a situation (government control) would
be undesirable.
The present section has given a brief account of the advent of broadcasting as it
took place in Britain and the United States of America (USA) as these countries
were among the first to experience the new technology. It has been clearly
demonstrated that in both cases the government took a keen interest in the
administration of radio broadcasting under the main justification of maintaining
order in the airwaves through spectrum allocation. It is worth noting that the USA
was not as successful as Britain in achieving this initially. The case of Britain will
be discussed in greater detail in the sections to follow as I wish to draw a
comparison between South Africa and Britain with regards to the approaches the
two countries have taken in dealing with broadcasting. This is primarily due to the
fact that the British broadcasting model has been considered by many as the
embodiment of the public service approach (Kuhn, 1988) which has been
adopted by a number of countries including South Africa.
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As in the case of Britain, the government of South Africa also became involved
with the regulation of radio almost from the very beginning and a history of South
African broadcasting clearly demonstrates this which will be the topic of
discussion for the section to follow. The section on South African broadcasting
history is relevant in the sense that it gives the reader an idea of the unique
socio-economic and political climate that existed at the time and will be crucial in
explaining and contributing to the understanding of the changes that later took
place especially when drawing a contrast between the South African
Broadcasting landscape and that of the British.
South African Broadcasting History
Broadcasting in South Africa can be said to have begun in the early 1920s since
it was at this time that enough amateurs engaged in broadcasting that the
government, through the office of the Postmaster General, issued licensing
regulations in 1923 (Orlick, 1970). The state took upon the responsibility of
issuing licences and acting as some form of regulatory authority from the onset
"The state called for the application of licences for the purpose of carrying out
official broadcasting by wireless in the Union of South Africa" (Hayman and Teer-
Tomaselli, 1989: 25). A number of applications were received but only one
licence was granted in each urban area and it was the local authorities that were
considered appropriate for conducting broadcasting as opposed to private
individuals. Ultimately three licences were issued by the state and they were to
the Cape Peninsular Publicity Association, the Durban Corporation and in
Johannesburg the Association of Scientific and Technical Societies (AS & TS).
These three stations began broadcasting in 1924, licensed under Act No 10 of
1911.
Radio, then, in the 1920s and early 1930s was primarily an urban and English
phenomenon, both linguistically and culturally. A number of legislative challenges
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however arose because the act in place only took into account radio telephony.
"This legislation was inadequate in enforcing the payment of listener's licence
fees, because the legislation assumed that the owner of the receiver apparatus
could be as easily identified and located as could the user of a two-way
apparatus" (Hayman and Teer-Tomaselli, 1989:25). However successive
modifications of this aspect of radio and broadcasting legislation have been
made, until the radio licence was itself abolished in the 1980s when income from
television licences and advertising on radio and television were deemed
adequate (Rosenthal 1974). At the time, it seems, no successful solution to the
licence problem was found as the three radio stations, instead of accumulating
capital, were running at a loss. As a result the Johannesburg station discontinued
broadcasting at the end of 1926.
Schlesinger, a successful entrepreneur in the fields of insurance, theatre and film
was later approached by the then Postmaster-General, MadeLey to assist in the
maintenance of a broadcasting station in the Transvaal area (Rosenthal, 1979).
Schlesinger agreed but had conditions of his own, he required that the licence
period be ten years and not five years as it had previously been, he also
requested that his new organisation, the African Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)
be given the licences of the Cape Town and Durban stations when they expired.
Among his other requests was that "legislation be modified so that production of
a valid listener's licence should be compulsory on purchase of a radio receiver"
(Hayman and Teer-Tomaselli, 1989: 25).ln 1927 the licences of the other stations
were ceded to the ABC but the licence period remained the same (five years).
The consideration of the new legislation was to be made at an early date but was
only introduced after the Second World War. Despite Schlesinger's business
acumen, the ABC was by 1929 operating at a deficit and he approached the
government for assistance. Schlesinger proposed measures such as the
government subsidising the ABC from an import tax on receivers and also the
government taking over the assets and allowing the company to go into
liquidation (Rosenthal, 1979). Other suggestions were that the government could
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collect the licence fees and pay the ABC its share and also establishing
subsidised relay stations in Bloemfontein and Pretoria.
The ABC, however was unsuccessful in its bid to the government for assistance
and as a result turned to commercial means. For example, the ABC reached an
agreement with the retailers of domestic radio receivers which resulted in the
introduction of the 'Blue Free Voucher Scheme' which increased sales of both
receivers and listener's licences, as well as offering an opportunity for income to
the listeners (Hayman and Teer-Tomaselli 1989). The Blue Free Voucher
Scheme proved to be very successful and "once it was fully operational,
listenership and thus sales of licences increased rapidly. As a result the ABC was
able to meet not only its running expenses, but also carry out improvements of a
capital nature, particularly transmitters" (Horwitz, 2001 :56). The commercial
orientation of the ABC was however offensive to important sections of both the
Afrikaans and the English community. This was mainly due to the fact that
Schlesinger's commercial techniques required him to maximize his audience by
focussing on the most popular programmes, which meant that the ABC had very
little programming for the Afrikaans community. Commercialism bothered the
English speakers, because it went against British hierarchical and elite notions of
culture.
As a result of the dissatisfaction of both sides of the white community and the
constant financial difficulties of the ABC among other reasons, there was a move
to place broadcasting under the state (Rosenthal 1974). John Reith, director-
general of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), after an invitation from
then South African Prime Minister Hertzog in 1934 to recommend a new structure
for broadcasting, suggested that the service be taken over by a public
corporation funded by the national treasury (Union of South Africa, 1934)
(Horwitz, 2001 :57). The proposal was supported by both the English and the
Afrikaans communities as this would follow more along the lines of the BBC
model and also allow for more Afrikaans programming. The newly fermed SABC
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then proceeded to buy out the operations of the ABC for 150 000 pounds and
began broadcasting in August 1936. Under the Broadcasting Act of 1936, the
governor general was given the authority to appoint members of the SABC Board
of Control which comprised of nine members, roughly half English and half
Afrikaans speakers. It is significant to note that at the time no other licence would
be issued to another potential station without the consent of the SABC, this
means that the SABC played both the role of broadcaster and regulator.
The attempts to apply the BBC model to South African broadcasting proved
problematic because of the hostility between the Afrikaans and the English, even
though attempts were made to equalise programming on the single medium
wave channel. It was however not easy to accomplish this and as a result the
bulk of programming reflected the urban, English, elite norm (Rosenthal 1974).
The unhappiness on the Afrikaner side was also due to the BBC broadcasts
which were seen as propaganda. The airing of BBC news on South African radio
finally ceased in 1950 and the SABC established its own news section. The
board attempted to deal with the problem of low Afrikaans language
programming in a number of ways but proved to be rather unsuccessful.
The board eventually decided the best way to deal with the problem would be to
establish a commercial channel. The government then appointed a commission
to investigate the matter. After its investigation, the commission approved the
decision but advised that it be provided by an independent organization, outside
the SABC, since it was a public utility. The government accepted the approval
given by the commission but ignored their advice when it came to who should run
the commercial venture and awarded the right to introduce a commercial station
to the SABC. Springbok radio was launched in 1950 and was funded through
advertising. Due to the fact that the advertisers were mainly English the station
"still retained an overall English character" (Horwitz, 2001: 59).
The black African community was also catered for with regards to radio services.
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During the Second World War the SABC, in joint partnership with the Department
of Native Affairs had established a single channel service, utilising wire and
loudspeakers, which transmitted to compounds,'hostels and residences in some
black townships. In 1945 however the service was shutdown when the
department of Native Affairs withdrew its support.
The purpose of this cable service, however was not purely entertainment and
education, it was also about social control, the cable service was designed with
the intention of orienting the emergent urban black labour force to the prevailing
ideology at the time (Horwitz, 2001). The service was revived in 1952 and
according to the 1952 SABC annual report, was to provide entertainment and
also contribute towards the prevention of crime and also contribute towards the
education of the Bantu (SABC Annual Report, 1952:36)
The SABC has been perceived as a tool for the nationalist government by a
number of activist groups (see media policy debate) although others argue this
isn't completely true there are elements of truth to this statement. Since the
SABC was, from its inception, a state corporation, when the nationalist
government came into power in 1948 they had the power to make some changes
and they were more often than not measured on how a particular policy would
affect the Afrikaner people rather than on the grounds of economic or
administrative rationality. "This culture created a hierarchy of people in the
parastatal managements, many of whom were there for reasons of ethnic loyalty
and personal security, primarily to serve the public or even carry out the job"
(Horwitz, 2001: 61). The intentions of the nationalist government were made
clear from the beginning because as soon as they came into power; members of
the broederbond were moved into the SABC board and other key management
positions (Berger, 2001)
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According to Graham Hayman and Ruth Teer-Tomaselli (1989) the long-standing
SABC practice of airing informative talks by impartial experts was gradually
displaced after 1948 by programmes oriented toward Afrikaner nationalism,
particularly programs promoting and defending the government's apartheid
policy. Inquisitive and independent individuals were not welcome in the top ranks
of the SABC. A liberal Cape Afrikaner named Gideon Roos, who believed in the
Reithian credo of impartiality, clashed constantly with the Broederbond-
dominated board as it endeavoured to transform broadcast programming. As a
result the SABC even suffered financially due to the government's reluctance to
assist. When Roos was ousted, however, in 1960, by Piet Meyer, who facilitated
a good relationship with the Nationalist government, the financial fortunes of the
SABC improved. Government decided to pay for the installation of a VHF/FM
system, permitting the creation of flexible network of six high fidelity channels.
Government also granted a long-term loan to SABC and authorized the collection
of licence fees on second and third radio receivers" (Hayman and Teer-Tomaselli
1989).
In keeping with the consolidation of apartheid, the 1960 broadcasting amendment
created an "equai but separate" structure for the administration of black
programmes. Government began paying a subsidy for the production of
programs for Radio Bantu. The three original white channels became national in
1959. Three more regional channels carrying advertising were introduced; Radio
Highveld in 1964, Radio Good Hope in 1965 and Radio Port Natal in 1967.
The present section has been a relatively detailed account of the history of South
African broadcasting and has hopefully presented the reader with a clearer
picture of the dynamics at the time. As has been demonstrated, over and above
the inevitable challenges that a country and a government would have to face
with the introduction of a new technology South Africa had to also deal with the
underlying power struggles that were taking place based on racial grounds. As a
result the development and service of broadcasting did not take place equally in
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the sense of catering for all the different sectors of South African society which
were so clearly segregated. Due to this phenomenon, when the political climate
began to change in South Africa one of the primary topics to be raised for
discussion was the issue of media policy in South Africa as will be discussed in
the section to follow.
The Transformation Process
The South African media landscape has been marked by significant changes
over the past few years mainly due to the political transformation process that
has been taking place in the country. The 1994 elections were a significant
turning point for all South Africans on many different levels and broadcast media
was certainly one of these. Leading up to the 1994 elections were a number of
conferences and negotiation meetings between members of the National Party
government, civil society groups, the previously exiled African National Congress
(ANC) and other groups and organizations with vested interests in the future of
South African media. According to Eric Louw (1993: 11) "[T]he civil war and the
military conflicts of the 1980s were transformed into a struggle for power via
negotiations and political manoeuvring in the 1990s".
The Viljoen Task Group
The debate about media policy and the role to be played by the media in the
process of democratic transformation can be said to have begun with the
appointment of the Viljoen Task group on 23 March 1990, a month after the
unbanning of the ANC. The Task group was appointed by the South African
Cabinet to advise it on a broadcasting policy. The appointment of this Task
Group, however, was met with criticism from both liberal and leftist
commentators; with claims that the Group's membership was unrepresentative of
all South Africans and that its deliberations were being held behind 'closed
doors', The Film and Allied Worker's Organisation (FAWO) activists saw a need
to protest against this process, as they believed the media policy issue belonged
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in the public realm. As a result they engaged in discussions with members of the
Campaign for Open Media (COM), who then organised a march on the SABC's
Aukland Park headquarters in August 1990 (Louw, 1993).
Despite protests, the Viljoen Task group continued behind closed doors except
for one session, which was held as an open meeting on 28 November 1990. In
response to the claims of the Task Group being unrepresentative, Christo Viljoen
mentioned that U[T]here are so many groups, organizations, companies,
institutions and individuals who could claim to have a stake or interest in the
broadcasting industry that it would have required an enormous Task Group to
satisfy their demands" (Louw, 1993: 29). The Task Group did however call on the
public to make written or oral submissions on any aspect of broadcasting and
these were received.
The Task Group moved forward by identifying three problems prevalent in the
then system of broadcasting regulation. These were; an outdated legislation, lack
of a comprehensive, long-term policy on broadcasting and fragmented control
over aspects of broadcasting. It was noted that the broadcasting sector had been
overseen by a number of different Cabinet ministers and this had resulted in a
lack of continuity and therefore direction. The Task Group felt that it was
important for a group of professionals and experts in the field to be responsible
for the regulation of broadcasting as in other countries. It was therefore proposed
that there be an Independent Broadcasting Authority. Along with the proposition
of an IBA, came the conditions that the commissioners be vetoed
by a Parliamentary committee (implying multi-party involvement); a
'sunshine clause' specifying that all deliberations of the IBA except
confidential financial details, are a matter of public record; the IBA's
accountability to Parliament; and a Broadcasting Court to review and
redress, if necessary, findings and rulings of the IBA (Viljoen and Cronje,
1993: 34-35).
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The Task Group completed its investigation and submitted a report, which then
became accessible to the public. There was even a debate on Radio 702
between Michael Markovitz of FAWO and Professor Christo Viljoen on 18
September 1991. In this debate Markovitz criticised the Task Group for being
vague and not acknowledging the complex nature of the transformation process.
This was evidenced by the absence of recommendatrons regarding interim
arrangements for the control and regulation of broadcasting (Currie, 1993).
FAWO also felt that the Task Group was partial towards the government by not
mentioning the misuse of the SABC for political purposes. The fact that the Vice
Chairman of the Task Group was also the Chairman of M-Net, became another
point of criticism as this was seen as the reason why the report contained no
remarks concerning "M-Net's blatant refusal to comply with local content
percentages negotiated in r986, Le. to have a domestic content of thirty percent
after five hundred subscribers had been reached" (Currie, 1993: 54).
On the positive side, FAWO did acknowledge that the Task Group had made
some good recommendations particularly those regarding the reduction of the
dependency of the public broadcaster on advertising revenue and the suggestion
to remove signal distribution from the control of the SABC.
Jabulani! Freedom of the Airwaves Conference
The Jabulani! Freedom of the Airwaves conference held in Doorn, Holland in
1991, is another initiative of the many that made up the contributing forces
towards the transformation of broadcasting in South Africa. The conference was
organised in order to discuss ways of moving forward into a democratic
dispensation where the media would no longer be under the direct influence of
the government. Concerns regarding the states plan to restructure broadcasting
were also raised. It was argued that the government shouldn't be able to privatise
the SABC during negotiations. It was suspected that the state wanted to remove
broadcasting from the political sphere so that when a new government came into
power they would not have the SABC at their disposal as the National Party
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government had. Willie Currie articulates this viewpoint by stating that "the
strategies of the state and big business aim at restructuring broadcasting before
a new government comes to power or a new constitution comes to force." (Willie
Currie in Jabulani! Freedom of the Airwaves, 1991: 9). The government at the
time and big business leaders were arguing for a policy that favoured market
regulation. The problem with this principle is that it tends to exclude the poor,
who were and still are mainly the black people of South Africa. It was time to
introduce change into the broadcasting sector but market regulation was not the
answer.
To suggest ways of bringing about change, the conference also dealt with issues
surrounding the Radio Act of 1952 and Broadcasting Act 73 of 1976. The major
problem noted with the Radio Act was that the Minister of Home Affairs and the
SABC had the power to veto the granting of a broadcasting licence. It is
undemocratic and inappropriate for a broadcaster to take up the roles of player
and referee. As a result of the governmentlSABC veto, the SABC was
entrenched as a monopoly in the free-to-air category and with only M-Net
functioning as a pay-per-view broadcaster. The SABC was established through
Broadcasting Act 73 of 1976 and it also defined its powers and activities. The
problem was that it allowed for the State President in consultation with the
Minister of Home Affairs to select the SABC board, which was constituted by
some powerful members of the Broederbond. Michael Markovitz, one of the
delegates at the conference, stated that, "The broadcasting Act, read in
conjunction with the Radio Act, has ensured that the control of public
broadcasting remains firmly in the hands of the Broederbond/National Party axis."
(Jabulani! Freedom of the Airwaves, 1991: 38).
The conference covered a number of issues regarding broadcasting and
ultimately came up with a few recommendations as to how to move forward. One
of the recommendations was to divide the broadcasting sector into three
sections, public Service, commercial and community broadcasting. The
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conference was of the view that public broadcasting should remain acco
untable
to the peo~ who constitute its viewer/listenership and not to its sou
rce of
funding. It was also established that since South Africa has a diverse pop
ulation
and also has to deal with deficiencies created by the apartheid system
, "the
public broadcaster must be held responsible not only for popular enterta
inment
and unbiased information, but also for educational programming" (Ja
bulani!
Freedom of the Airwaves, 1991: 67). With regards to the funding of the
public
broadcaster, it was recommended that an investigation be carried out in o
rder to
determine the viability of cutting on advertising and perhaps subsidis
ing the
broadcaster through either licence fees or levies on services. It was not
ed that
commercial broadcasters had just as much of a responsibility as the
public
broadcaster and should therefore have guidelines with regards to proc
edures
concerning advertising. As far as community broadcasting is concerned,
it was
perceived that this sector should be participatory and should be owne
d and
controlled by the community itself.
There were a number of other initiatives such as a media policy workshop
, which
took place at Rhodes University in 1990 and a conference, entitled "Fre
e, Fair
and Open Media", hosted by the Campaign for Open Media (COM) held in
1992.
"These initiatives culminated in the democratic and transparent appointm
ent in
May 1993 of a new governing board for the SABC, and the setting u
p of a
regulatory body - the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), the fo
llowing
year" (Tomaselli and Dunn, 2001: 125). The appointment of the SABC
board
however was not a smooth process. Firstly the appointment of the se
lection
panel was marred by controversy and secondly when the selection pan
el had
appointed 25 people as board members, the "State President intervene
d, and
persuaded the panel to change seven of its names as well as the Chairp
erson"
(Louw, 1993: 65). Based on the controversial discussions that took place
during
the transformation process it goes without saying that broadcasting was
and in




It should be acknowledged that South Africa has had a relatively unique his
tor~cal
experience which will be carried through the generations for many years to
come
and this will take place on many different levels - socially, economical
ly and
politically. The historical landscape of the broadcasting industry in the cou
ntry is
a minute glimpse into the effects of apartheid, the struggle for freedom
and
ultimately the attainment of what many refer to as democracy. This reality f
iltered
through into every aspect of society. With regards to broadcasting, the p
olicies
put in place by government were to a large extent oppressive which
was
consistently characteristic of the government at the time across the
board.
Hayman and Tomaselli attribute this to:
... a great linguistic, ethnic, racial and cultural diversity among the
population, and history of segregationist policies based on and
exaggerating these diversities. Partly as a result of this, class conflict over
the distribution of wealth has been more extreme than in the USA and the
UK, requiring a great degree of repressive activity by the dominant group
in order to retain its power (1989:23). .
I believe this goes to explain the complexity of the history of South A
frican
broadcasting because over and above the challenges of regulating the us
e of a
new technology as faced by other countries such as Britain, there was als
o this
other issue of perhaps intentionally using it to retain power or at the very
least
making sure that it does not fall into the hands of others who may use it a
gainst
the government.
The next section takes a closer look at how the advent of broadcasting wa
s dealt
with in Britain particularly with regards to legislation and policy.
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Chapter four
The British Broadcasting Corporation
Broadcasting regulation has become increasingly complicated over the
years
due to the many factors that need to be taken into consideration. With dem
ocracy
as the current dominant political ideology in most countries, it is necessary
for all
policies to include and apply to all sectors of society. Which means that eve
n with
broadcasting, all members of the public should be catered for. The di
fficulty
however, as already pointed out in section 3, is that the media industry is li
ke any
other business, the ultimate goal is to maximise profits. As a result of this
some
sectors of society may find themselves neglected. To avoid this occur
rence,
regulators need to step in and implement policies that will safeguard
these
democratic principles because a "free and diverse media are an indispe
nsable
part of the democratic process" (sic) (Doyle, 1996: 85). Public broadc
asters
should be a part of the solution to such prob~ems. Their principle motive
should
not be profit maximisation but serving the public in all its diversity. Thi
s is of
course complicated by the fact that public service broadcasters do not ope
rate in
a vacuum, they are also subject to economic pressures. Such conside
rations
need to be taken into account when formulating media policies.
This section will briefly discuss some of the media policies that have
been
implemented in the United Kingdom (UK) as this is a country with a som
ewhat
similar broadcasting model to that of South Africa, for comparative pur
poses.
There will then be a discussion of some South African media policie
s and
implementation as well as the interactions between the regulator an
d the
broadcasters, in particular the public broadcaster. The British Broadc
asting
Corporation (BBC) is the national and public service broadcaster of the UK
and is
publicly funded mainly through the collection of licence fees. It was estab
lished.
as the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1927. Before that it was call
ed the
British Broadcasting Company and was created and owned by six
radio
manufacturers and was in essence run as a commercial venture. The co
mpany
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was seen as "a monopoly to enrich the six large firms" (Hood and O'Leary
,1990:
06) by smaller companies and the government, in an effort to resolve the
matter
set up a committee in 1923 that "would look into broadcasting and prescrib
e how
it should be managed" (Hood and O'Leary, 1990: 06). According to McD
onnell
(1991), the British Broadcasting Company was having problems with the fa
ct that
people were avoiding the payment of licence fees which were payable up
on the
purchase of BBC wireless sets by acquiring experimenter's or home constr
uctor's
licences. The BBC saw as a solution, an increase in the other licence fee
s and
the application of stricter measures for those who don't pay at all by the
Post
Office. It was however reluctant to do this, but nevertheless, the Post M
aster
General set up a committee in 1923 to review the whole quest
ion of
broadcasting. The committee decided that for the time being the BBC
should
remain a private company. It did however acknowledge that the wave spe
ctrum
was a valuable entity and should be public property managed by the
state
through the Postmaster-General. It also suggested that a standing comm
ittee,
possibly called the Broadcasting Board should be set up by statute. to as
sist in
the technical and general operation of broadcasting.
The committee came to the conclusion that the airwave spectrum of the c
ountry
should be considered as public property and therefore thought it necess
ary for
the control of such a powerful instrument to remain in the hands of the state
.
As a result of the committee's findings and conclusions it was decided th
at the
company be handed over to another body, which then became the
British
Broadcasting Corporation. This body was to act as a Trustee for the n
ational
interest and was also to carry out duties that corresponded with those of a
public
service, (Hood and O'Leary, 1990). With Lord John Reith's conception
of the
BBC as a public broadcaster, the organisation had a duty to provide a sign
al that
every citizen with the proper equipment could pick up. In order to preve
nt the
likelihood of direct government control over the public entity, it was decided
that a
board of governors be elected. He also believed that the public broad
caster
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could not be morally and socially neutral, "what it expresses is the cons
ensual
view of society - that body of opinion which is generally accepted by all 'se
nsible'
people and which requires no further definition" (Hood and O'Leary, 199
0: 10).
This statement could be interpreted as too utilitarian, meaning that the
public
broadcaster is to cater and express the views of the majority while sidelinin
g any
alternative views which may contradict the more popular opinions.
Despite the Director General's (Lord John Reith) seemingly good intention
s, the
BBC was often accused of being subservient to the government. It has
been
cited that in an effort to avoid offending the great dictators of the Thirtie
s, the
BBC did not discuss crucial issues such as the rise of fascism and the p
light of
those suffering from the depression. Such instances have led some to th
e view
that the BBC "did not discharge what many would now see as its public d
uty: to
provide a forum in which the great political and social issues of the day
were
debated" (Hood and O'Leary, 1990: 11). Ralph Negrine shows th
at the
description of the BBC as being neutral was a misleading one because "Th
e BBC
has never been ideologically neutral. Moreover, in the past it has bee
n the
subject of fierce political controversy, most notably over its role in the
1926
General Strike and the 1956 Suez crisis" (1989)
What makes such instances even more problematic from a democratic p
oint of
view is that the BBC had monopoly status due to the fact that it had ente
red an
agreement with the Post Office which disallowed the establishment
of any
commercial stations in Britain. As far as broadcasting was concerned, the
public
only had one voice, one viewpoint. This meant they only heard on their rad
io sets
what the BBC wanted them to hear and nothing else, "[T]he BBC was ded
icated
to the promulgation of mainstream views. Any views that lay outsid
e the
mainstream found difficulty in finding a voice over the air" (Hood and O
'Leary,
1990: 12). This was made even more serious by the fact that the press wa
s also




The BBC's Monopoly status was soon challenged when entrepreneurs saw a gap
that they could fill. This gap was created by Reith's decision to only begin
broadcasts on a Sunday at 12:30pm and even then these programmes were to
be of an entirely religious nature. Due to the fact that commercial broadcasters
were not allowed to broadcast in Britain, an entrepreneur by the name of Leonard
Plugge began beaming programmes into Britain from stations located in
Southern Ireland or the European mainland (Crissell, 1997). Although Plugge had
started out by buying airtime on certain foreign stations within reach of Britain
and then selling that airtime as advertising space to British companies, in 1931
he founded Radio Normandie which broadcast from the Northern coast of
France, providing a very clear signal. Radio Normandie proved to be popular
with the audiences and began doing very well in terms of revenues from
advertising. Another station, Luxembourg, began broadcasting in 1933 although
this meant ignoring the International Broadcasting Union (IBU) which was a body
put in place to allocate wavelengths. Like Normandie, Luxembourg aired populist
content. The BBC, being unhappy about this put forward strong requests to the
IBU, to get both Normandie and Luxembourg off air but without success.
The monopoly status of the BBC was becoming increasingly problematic for a
number of people, even a former Director General of the BBC, Sir Frederick
Ogilvie (1 October 1938 - January 1942) who expressed his concerns in a letter
to the Editor of a newspaper (The Times) in 1946. His letter was particularly in
response to the decision made by the Labour government to renew the BBC
charter without a public inquiry into the BBC as had been demanded by various
people. Ogilvie was surprised by the fact that the government was willing to settle
the future of pubric service broadcasting without the public's input. He also went
on to express his views on the monopoly, stating that "Freedom is choice. And
monopoly of broadcasting is inevitably the negation of fieedom, no matter how
efficiently it is run, or how wise and kindly the boards of committees in charge of
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it" (The Times, 26 June 1946 quoted in McDonnell, 1991: 20). Despite protests
from various people, including Ogilvi-e, the Labour government released a White
Paper in July of 1946 rejecting the calls for a public inquiry and reaffirmed its
position and belief that only a monopoly public broadcasting service could
guarantee that all sections of the public in all areas of the country would be
offered a 'balanced' range of programmes.
It was only in 1949 that the Labour government finally launched an inquiry into
the future of broadcasting. The Committee to conduct the inquiry was led by Lord
Beveridge. During this time the BBC prepared its evidence for the Beveridge
Committee. The BBC's position was in line with the beliefs of Lord John Reith as
they argued that monopoly status enabled the BBC to carry out its duties
unhindered and therefore allowed for a high maintenance of standards. The BBC
argued in this document that competition would lead to a lowering of the
standards as they would be more inclined to please the-viewers in order to keep
them watching with populist programming.
The Beveridge Report was released in 1951 and it recommended that the BBC
remain a monopoly. It did however emphasise that safeguards be taken in order
to avoid any possible abuses. The Committee also stressed that ultimately, "the
highest social purpose of broadcasting was education" (McDonnell, 1991: 28).
"The duty of the broadcasting authority is not to please the greatest possible
number of listeners but to keep open the channel for communication of ideas of
all kinds, popular and unpopular" (McDonnell, 1991: 29). There was however, a
member of the Committee by the name of Selwyn L1oyd, who opposed the idea
of a BBC monopoly. He believed that a commercial radio and television system
set up to compete with and complement the BBC would be more beneficial for
the general public, particularly in terms of choice and the expression of
alternative views. Although L10yd never advocated for an American system of
broadcasting, he made it clear that he wanted a system that fell somewhere
between the American and British one. Despite L1oyd's attempts to counter the
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Committee's report, the labour government issued its White Paper seven months
later and as had been expected, it followed Beveridge's recommendations.
The Labour government fell from office before it could affect its last White Paper.
The Conservative party, which took over from the Labour government, drafted its
own White Paper in 1952 which was not very different from that of the Labour
government. The White Paper supported the continuation of the BBC monopoly
but mentioned that some additional safeguards be put into place in order to avoid
the likelihood of the Corporation being used to achieve political ends. The White
Paper did however mention that U[T]he present government have come to the
conclusion that, in the expanding field of television, provision should be made to
permit some element of competition when the calls on capital resources, at
present needed for the purposes of greater national importance makes this
feasible... " (McDonnell, 1991: 31).
The more significant change took place with the release of the Conservative
government's 1953 White Paper. The Paper called for the setting up of a
regulatory body to oversee commercial television. The body itself, would of
course function as a public enterprise. The following year in 1954, commercial
television was established through the passing of the Television Act. The Act set
out the duties and responsibilities of the new regulatory body which was named
the Independent Television Authority. The government also stipulated that there
would be no sponsoring of programmes, which is where advertisers would buy
time on television transmitters and provide and control their own programmes.
This was a step taken by the government in order to avoid the over-
commercialisation of television. It was relatively clear from the onset that the
government was very weary of the introduction of commercial broadcasting. This
was demonstrated by the conditions which had to be met by the Authority, which
were not equally applied to the BBC.
The Authority was also instructed to reach an agreement with the Postmaster-
General, the minister who was then responsible for broadcasting, to decide
how frequently the commercial breaks could come. In the event, the interval
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between the breaks was set at approximately twenty minutes. What is
interesting about the ground-rules laid down by the Act is that there are no
such detailed prescriptions in the Charter of the BBC (Hood and O'Leary,
1990: 23).
Television proved to be very popular in the 1950s and there was a tussle
between the BBC and the Independent Television (ITV) companies for the rights
to a third television channel. This is the main reason why the Pilkington
Committee was set up in 1960. The BBC and the ITV companies had to put
forward their cases in an effort to convince the Committee as to why they should
be granted the third television licence. After both sides had presented their cases
and much deliberation, the Committee released a report in 1962. The report
condemned commercial television stating that the system had a fundamental
weakness, which was its obligation to serving two contradictory purposes. The
Committee claimed that commercial television, on the one hand, was meant to
use its power to influence values and moral standards, which therefore meant
that they should provide a wide range of content material. On the other hand they
were expected to provide a servlce to advertisers (Hood and O'Leary, 1990). The
Committee felt that these two did not coincide and as a result, in terms of
television, the purposes of broadcasting were to a certain extent not being
realised. The Committee commended the BBC and awarded them the third
television licence.
As a result of the Pilkington Committee report a new Television Act was put in
place in order to bring commercial television fully into the public service
framework (McDonnell, 1991). The 1963 Television Act stipulated that
independent television should from then on function as a public service.
Studying the various topics of debate that took place regarding broadcasting
policy, it becomes clear that in Britain, the concerns surrounding broadcasting
were mainly centred around issues of spectrum allocation, government control,
ideological neutrality or rather the lack thereof, commercialisation of the airwaves
53
and of course Rethian principles. These were all issues to be dealt with in South
Africa as well to some greater or lesser extent, however, there was an extra
dimension to be considered when dealing with South African broadcasting which
related to the concerted effort to exclude specific sectors of society (further
entrenched through segregationist policies) and if they were to be included it was
primarily for the purposes of further social control through the orientation of the
dominated group to the prevailing ideology (Fourie, 2001).
Having just discussed the historical aspect of British broadcasting and comparing
it to the South African case in this section, it seems appropriate to continue and
discuss the more contemporary broadcasting landscape of Britain and thereafter
draw comparisons.
The Office of Communications
It is clear that in the past the British Government had a major influence over
broadcasting (especially public service) since this area was usually left to the
responsibility of government officials in particular the Post Master General. Over
the years much has been done in an effort to limit the amount of not only political,
but also economic influence. The most significant improvement has been the
introduction of independent regulators. The current official regulator of the
communication industries, with responsibilities across television, radio,
telecommunications and wireless communications services in the United
Kingdom is known as Ofcom; short for Office of Communications. Ofcom was
initially established in the Office of Communications Act of 2002, but received its
full authority from the Communications Act of 2003. Before the establishment of
Ofcom however, each sector of the electronic media industry was assigned a
specific regulator separate from the rest. In broadcasting there were three main
regulators, namely the Broadcasting Standards Commission, the Independent
Television Commission and the Radio Authority. In essence all three of these
were governed by the Broadcasting Act of 1996.
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The Broadcasting Standards Commission was the statutory body for both
standards and fairness in Broadcasting. It covered all radio and television, both
terrestrial and satellite. It had three main tasks as established by the
Broadcasting Act of 1996 and they were to produce codes of conduct relating to
standards and fairness, secondly to consider and adjudicate on complaints and
thirdly to monitor, research and report on standards and fairness in
broadcasting.4 The Commission was funded by the Department of Culture, Media
and Sports. The independent Television Commission was responsible for the
licensing and regulation of all television services broadcasting in or from the UK
except for BBC license fee funded services and S4C. It was responsible for
setting and monitoring standards for programme content, advertising,
sponsorship and technical quality including the administration of a range of
penalties if standards were not met.5
The Radio Authority was responsible for the licensing and regulation of all
commercial radio service providers in the UK and this had to be done in
accordance with the Broadcasting Act of 1996. The Authorities three main tasks
were to plan frequencies, to appoint licencees with a view to providing viewers
with a wider range of choice and to regulate programming and advertising. The
Radio Authorities only source of income came from an annual licence fee paid by
the licencees of the Authority.
At this point it seems necessary to briefly discuss the 1996 Broadcasting Act
which guided these three regulators before returning to Ofcom and discussing
the current policies.
The Broadcasting Act of 1996 was meant to promote diversity and choice for




conducive to industry growth and development in all facets. The government saw
it as important for the broadcasters to be liberated so that they could take full
advantage of the technological advancements and market opportunities that were
taking place and still are (Doyle 2002). According to the Green Paper on Media
Ownership of 1995, which addressed some of the concerns and objectives of the
1996 Broadcasting Act, the Government decided that there was a continuing
case for specific regulations governing media ownership but there was also a
need to liberalize the existing ownership regulations both within and across
different media sectors (Doyle 2002). The two key priorities of the Act were the
promotion of pluralism which is of a socio-political nature and that which is of an
economic nature; the promotion of the economic development of industry which
would mean the preservation of competition, promotion of efficiency and the
encouragement of the international competitiveness of UK media firms.
Despite the fact that the issue of safeguarding pluralism was presented as
essential, what was suggested in the Act was offering less than before in the way
of protection of pluralism, "In effect, the new media ownership provisions allow for
radio, television and newspapers in the UK to be supplied by fewer media owners
than had previously... " (Doyle, 2002: 106). The reason for this is that the general
trend in Europe was to increasingly deregulate in order to accommodate the
technological changes that were taking place. Furthermore there was a strong
case presented by stakeholders in the industry for deregulation whereas there
were few persuasive proponents working to counter the arguments coming from
industry;
The absence of an influential supporting constituency for pluralism meant that
it - the so-called main objective for the new media ownership rules - became
consigned to ministerial rhetoric rather than any meaningful priority for those
drafting legislative changes (Doyle, 2002: 107).
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A member of the Department of National Heritage (DNH) (an organisation
previously responsible for the formulation of certain broadcasting policies) stated
that during this time the DNH needed to work out how much needed to be done
in order to buy off most of the media and, in particular, the newspaper sector of
the media, to the extent that they would back up their proposals. This indicates
that careful steps were taken so as to appease the media industry stakeholders
and gain their support. It has also been mentioned that negotiations took place
between the government and the media which paved the way for media owners
to get exactly what they had hoped for - fewer restrictions (Doyle, 2002). It is
clear that the formulation process of the policies contained in the Act was not free
of undue influence from stakeholders in the industry and from the government
and this is reflected in the way that the Act adheres to market forces.
Nevertheless new legislation has since been passed although certain aspects of
the 1996 Broadcasting Act are still in effect.
In December of 2000 the Government released a White Paper stating that in light
of the new converging market conditions it was necessary to reform the rules
which protect media plurality. The White Paper emphasized the importance of
access to a diverse range of services. The White Paper, however, proposed for a
further relaxation of ownership rules. It had been hoped that the ushering in of a
new government after the victory of the Labour Party in the 1997 elections would
result in some changes but it still seemed that pluralism was "consigned to the
back burner while the real priority driving media owneship policy changes [is] a
desire to facilitate the ambitions and concerns of major UK commercial media
players" (Doyle, 2002: 123). The need to compete on a global scale against
companies from the US, for example, put pressure on media policy-makers to
relax ownership rules.
The main point made by the White Paper was the idea of rationalizing and co-
ordinating regulation in the UK right across the converging telecommunications
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and broadcasting sectors. The key proposal was the creation of a single
regulatory entity called Ofcom.
In December 2003 Ofcom inherited the duties that had previously been the
responsibility of five regulatory bodies.; namely the Broadcasting Standards
Commission (BSC), the Independent Television Commission (ITC), the Office of
telecommunuications (Oftel), the Radio Authority (RA) and the Radio
Communications Agency (RCA).
Ofcom comprises of a board which provides strategic direction for Ofcom, with a
Non-Executive Chairman, five Non-Executive Directors and three Executive
Directors including the Chief Executive Officer. The executive is a team of senior
managers who are responsible for the day to day running of Ofcom. In addition to
this it also comprises of board committees and advisory committees. The Non-
Executive Chairman and Directors are appointed by the Secreatary of State for
Culture, Media and Sports. This can be problematic when dealing with the issue
of government influence over broadcasting because if the board (influencial
decision-makers) are appointed by a government official, one can argue then that
the regulator is simply an extension of the Governemnt. Under normal
circumstances, where government might not have a vested interest, this would
not be a problem. In the case of broadcasting however any government is well
aware of its influential power and so for government to have some way of
influencing the decisions made by the regulators of this industry can be cause for
concern.
Ofcom derives its main duties and responsibilities from the Communications Act
of 2003. According to the Act, Ofcom's principal duty is to "further the interests of
citizens in relation to communication matters and to further the interests of
consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by promoting competition"6.
6 http://www.ofcom.org.uk/aboutlsdrp/
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More specifically Ofcom's duties fall within six areas;
1. Ensuring the optimal use of the electro-magnetic spectrum;
2. Ensuring that a wide range of electronic communications services -
including high speed data services - is available throughout the UK;
3. Ensuring a wide range of TV and radio services of high quality and wide
appeal;
4. Maintaining plurality in the provision of broadcasting;
5. Applying adequate protection for audiences against offensive or harmful
material; and
6. Applying adequate protection for audiences against unfairness or the
infringement of privacy.
Clearly the designated duties of Ofcom take into account the concerns and
issues already discussed in the previous sections such as pluralism and diversity.
One wonders how much of a priority these issues are especially when pitted
against market interests.
The regulator is accountable to the British Parliament through the submission of
an annual report. In addition to this, Ofcom is accountable to the Public Accounts
Committee for propriety and value for money and also according to the
Communications Bill, Ofcom may be inspected by the National Audit Office.
The Communications Act of 2003 grants the regulator extensive powers in
connection with the management of the electromagnetic spectrum. It adopts a
market-based approach to spectrum management where Ofcom may permit
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companies to sell their rights to use the spectrum (spectrum trading) subject to
restrictions aimed towards the protection of the public interest. The reason
provided by the Government for this is that it allows for more efficient means of
reallocating the spectrum than administrative planning. This can be interpreted as
a move towards the direct commodification of the electromagnetic spectrum
which should in principle be a public entity. It has been stated that the incoming
service provider would have to comply with certain restrictions but this slightly
shifts the responsibility of spectrum allocation from the regulator to service
providers. Spectrum trading can have undesirable consequences because one
might find a situation where the spectrum is auctioned and sold to the highest
bidder, giving those with limited financial resources little chance of entering the
market. This creation of financial barriers can further exacerbate the problem of
attaining and maintaining pluralism.
With regards to content the Act introduced a new and more liberal three-tiered
system of regulation. The first tier applies to all broadcasters and concerns itself
with ensuring that the basic level of obligations are met, for example that the
programming output of all UK television and radio broadcasters complies with
basic domestic, European and international standards. This includes matters
such as general taste and decency, accuracy and impartiality, the protection of
minors, advertising and sponsorship. The second tier which applies only to
public service broadcasters and public/commercial broadcasters concerns itself
with obligations which can be quantified or measured. Ofcom is thus responsible
for ensuring that service providers comply with conditions such as quotas
regarding content. If these quotas aren't met, the regulator has a number of
options with regards to sanctions that can be imposed. The third tier of content
regulation concerns itself with the provision of what may be referred to as high
quality programming by the commercial PSBs - ITV licencees (ITV 1,2,3 and 4),
Channel 4 and Channel 5.7 This category includes a number of quality and
diversity obligations such as the provision of educational and religious programs.
7 http://con.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/11/3/75
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It also requires the service providers to ensure that their obligation to cater for
minority interests is reflected in their programming. These obligations however
are to be enforced and monitored through the means of self-regulatory
structures. Ofcom may only step in if upon a review of the situation it has been
found that the service provider has failed to fulfil I these obligations, unless of
course the reason is of an economic nature. According to the Government the
decision to apply self-regulation with regards to the qualitative aspects of public
service broadcasting is intended to allow broadcasters greater flexibility in
meeting these ideals.
The aspect of media ownership regulation in the Communications Act has
generated much criticism especially with regards to the provisions that liberalise
media and cross-media ownership rules. The decision to liberalise was guided by
three main factors put forward by the government. The first was the need by UK
commercial media for new sources of investment; secondly it was believed that
the source of investment was irrelevant provided effective content regulatory
structures were in place; thirdly the ownership rules had to reflect the reality that
the media were now competing in a global market.8 As a result media ownership
restrictions have been significantly weakened. For example a fifteen percent
upper audience limit for ownership of UK television broadcasting companies and
a rule which banned single ownership of the two ITV licenses were both revoked.
Another change was the abandonment of a points system which limited
ownership of radio broadcasting across the UK to a 15 percent share of
commercial audiences.9 The government justified the shift towards a more
liberalised market by stating that:
Whilst the need for a plurality of media sources remains clear, we
are committed to a deregulatory approach to media markets.




benefit existing companies and potential new investors, providing
for further consolidation, greater efficiency, more scope for
investment, and a more significant international presence. Growth
and investment provide opportunities for innovation, and this
should result in new, improved and cheaper products for the
consumer. 10
Both the 1996 Broadcasting Act and the 2003 Communications Act acknowledge
the importance of diversity and pluralism especially through the advocation of
competition within the media industry. However, It is unfortunate that the policies
being set in the best interests of the existing service providers negate any efforts
made towards the achievement of pluralism and diversity. "Under the new rules,
many regions in the UK may eventually receive radio broadcasts from stations
owned by only two companies other than the BBC"11. Economic interests
continue to override those of the public because even public service
broadcasters increasingly find themselves under pressure to yield to economic
pressures in order to generate sufficient income to go towards the production of
quality programs. Steven Barnett (2004) expressed his concerns about the 2003
Communications Act in the following words:
In more general terms, the duty on Ofcom to secure 'light touch regulation'
and to withdraw from its regulatory duties where possible, owe more to a
traditional economic model of regulation which may well be appropriate for
the telecoms sector. For broadcasting, it is a much riskier approach12.
Although British broadcasting has been heavily regulated in the past (Negrine
1988) mainly in the interests of the public according to Rethian principles (A
monopolistic public broadcaster) which were "largely and deliberately in
ignorance of audience preferences" (Kuhn 1988: 05) there has been a significant
shift towards the deregulation of media policies.
:~ OTI and OCMS, Constitution on Media Ownership Rules (November 2001), p.7.
http://con.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/1113/75
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The present section of the paper has clearly demonstrated that the changes that
have transpired in Britain over the years can be attributed mainly to the need to
address technological advancements in the industry and the rising concerns with
regards to issues of pluralism and diversity although market concerns and the
ability to compete globally seem to have taken precedence as indicated by the
relaxation of ownership rules. The changes that have taken place in South Africa
on the other hand, as discussed under the section The Transformation Process,
have been in a sense revolutionary and have been primarily politically motivated.
The most dramatic of these changes of course is the change in political climate
from an apartheid regime to a more democratic one. The following section
outlines the developments that have taken place in South Africa post-1994 in
terms of broadcast policy.
Broadcasting Regulation in the 'New South Africa'
Following the numerous discussions that took place during the transformative
period, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) was established in order to
regulate broadcasting in a democratic environment while the South African
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (SATRA) was to regulate the
telecommunications industry separately. However, primarily due to convergence,
the two regulators were merged, amidst concerns and speculation, to form the
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) in July 2000
through the ICASA Act (of 2000).
According to the ICASA Act (2000) the authority is to act through a council. The
council is headed by a Chairperson supported by six councillors. The chairperson
and councillors are appointed by the president on the recommendation of the
National Assembly for terms between two to five years. Directly accountable to
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FIG. 1: Organogram of the ICASA13
With regards to broadcasting the ICASA draws its mandate mainly from the
Broadcasting ACT 4 (of 1999) and the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act
(of 1993). Other forms of legislation that govern broadcasting are the
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act (of 2000), Media
13 Source: http://www.icasa.org.za/Content.aspx?Page=38
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Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA) Act (2002) and the Promotion of
Access to Information Act, 2000 to mention but a few. For the purposes of this
exercise; Broadcasting Act 4 (of 1999) and the Independent Broadcasting
Authority Act of 1993 will be discussed in greater detail.
Legislation/Policy
The Independent Broadcasting Act of 1993 took effect from 30 March 1994. Its
main task was to establish an independent regulator that would function with the
interests of the public at the core of its existence. Although the IBA was
transformed and incorporated into a larger structure, the ICASA, "[T]he provisions
in the IBA Act that establish the regulatory framework for broadcasting in South
Africa still remain in force" (Mochaba et ai, 2003: 75).
The key provisions in the Act refer mainly to the issuing of licences, the defining
of the powers granted to the Minister and also the issue of media ownership.
With regards to licences, firstly, the Act prohibits any signal distribution and
broadcasting service from taking place without a licence. The ICASA is granted
the power to invite licence applications through the publication of a notice in the
Gazette. The licensing process is only public to the extent that, firstly, the ICASA
may hold public hearings before issuing a broadcasting service licence (this is
based solely on the discretion of the ICASA) and, secondly, it is required by the
Act to keep a record of all documentation related to the licensing process and to
ensure that this is made available for public inspection. It is interesting to note
that, based on the Act; the ICASA is solely responsible for the selection of the
successful applicant with no involvement from the executive arm of government.
(Mochaba et al: 2003)
Organisations with existing licences may apply for their renewal before the expiry
date. The ICASA may only refuse to renew a licence if, during the licensed
period, the licensee has failed to comply with the licence conditions. Refusal of
licence renewal may also take place if there has been a failure to comply with the
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provisions stipulated in the Act and the ICASA is convinced that should the
licence be renewed, these failures will continue.
The Minister of Communications may at times require the ICASA to conduct
special investigations and inquiries in order to determine priorities for the
development of the broadcasting industry. Although the Minister may also issue
policy directions to ICASA, the authority is not required to follow these policy
directions but only to take them into consideration.
Sections 48 to 51 of the Act address the issue of media ownership and it is
stipulated herein that no one or more foreign persons may be in direct or indirect
control of a commercial broadcasting licence. There is also a prohibition on any
one company having direct or indirect control of more than one commercial
television broadcasting licence. The issue of cross-ownership is also addressed
and it is stated that a person who controls a newspaper may not "control a radio
- or television licence in an area where the newspaper has an average ABC
circulation of twenty percent of the total newspaper readership in the area."
(Section 52(2) (b).
The Broadcasting Act of 1999 was mainly established in order to provide a
framework for the public broadcaster under which to operate. Secondly, it was to
establish a new broadcasting policy for South Africa as well as to clearly define
the role and powers of the Minister of Communications with regards to the
regulation of broadcasting.
The Act deals extensively with the public broadcaster. The charter set out in the
Act requires the SABC to provide programmes in the South African official
languages that offer a plurality of views. It also requires the SABC to provide
viewing that advances the national and public interest. The charter makes it clear
that the public broadcaster should have a code of practice that ensures the
equitable treatment of all segments of the South African population particularly
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through the equitable treatment of all official languages. As a public broadcaster
the corporation is also expected to provide programming that is fair, unbiased
and independent from government and commercial interests. With regards to
revenue, the corporation may receive income from advertising, sponsorships,
grants, donations, licence fees and grants from the state.
With regards to the organisational structure of the SABC, the Act stipulates that
the broadcaster should consist of two separate operational divisions. These are a
public service division and a commercial service division. It goes on to say that
the two divisions be separately administered both having independent financial
records and accounts. The commercial service division of the SABC is subject to
the same policy and regulations as those applicable to other commercial
broadcasting services. Over and above such regulations the commercial services
division is also expected to subsidise the public services.
The ICASA is empowered by the Act to monitor and enforce compliance with the
charter by the SABC but at the same time highlights the importance of the
SABC's right to "freedom of expression and to journalistic, creative and
programming independence as enshrined in the Constitution" (Mochaba et ai,
2003: 79).
The board of the SABC consists of twelve non-executive members (the first
board consisted of twenty five members but this number was later changed) and
then three other executive members. The twelve non-executive members are to
be appointed by the President on the advice of the national assembly. The public
are to participate in terms of the nomination process. The President then
designates one of the members of the board to the position of chairperson and
another as deputy chairperson.
Chapter five addresses commercial broadcasting services in general.
Commercial broadcasters are expected to provide a diverse range of
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programming catering for a wide section of the public. As a whole they must also
provide programming in all the South African official languages. Such
programming must, as a whole, "reflect the culture, character, religion, needs and
aspirations of the people in the regions that they are licensed to serve subject to
licence conditions" (Broadcasting Act, 1999: chapter 5 30(2) (a)). Another
important element to be considered is the requirement of the provision of a
significant amount of South African programming and also the inclusion of news
and information programmes. The Act also deals with community broadcasting
services and basically requires that a particular station be managed and
controlled by a board which must be democratically elected from members of the
community in which the station will be broadcasting. The programming should
also address the needs and aspirations of the community while playing a
developmental role.
Based on broadcasting policy South Africa is rightfully considered a democratic
country and this is demonstrated particularly the broadcasting Act embraces
principles of equality, unity and diversity. However one wonders to what extent it
is actualised in reality. It is important to acknowledge and congratulate the
government's attempts at a more democratic media policy but even more
importantly, there needs to be a way of establishing whether the policies that
embrace democracy so emphatically simply remain on paper or in actual fact do
come to fruition.
During the apartheid era there is no doubt that broadcasting in South Africa was
discriminatory particularly along colour lines. In the democratic dispensation it is
hoped that this is no longer the case and the changes that have taken place over
the past few years demonstrate a concerted effort towards the acknowledgement
and respect of different race groups (cf. Horwitz 2001; Teer-Tomaselli 2005).
This is particularly evident through the availability of programmes in the various
official languages, especially news bulletins. Discrimination, however, does not
begin and end with race as the issue. Discrimination based on the economic
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status of an individual or group is also just as undemocratic and unacceptable.
Although this is the case, due to the highly capitalist and commodified
environment within which broadcasting takes place, economic discrimination
seems to go unnoticed and therefore unaddressed.
With all these issues to deal with, it is clear that the Authority faces many
challenges on a number of different levels but for the purposes of this study I'd
like to point out two contemporary fundamental issues. Firstly it is faced with the
challenge of regulating a highly dynamic industry with multiple changes
(particularly technological) constantly taking place.
Digitization, international agreements, converging services, proliferating
platforms and prospects of additional services are all affecting the conduct of
media regulation worldwide, transforming the ways media regulation is
considered and debated by scholars, activists and players alike ( O'Regan,
2000:5).
The implications therefore become that whatever policies are formulated or
amended have to be flexible in order to accommodate whatever possible new
developments that may arise in the near future while at the same time
"... secure[ing] significant benefits for the wider society and the economically
disadvantaged" (Dunn, 1995: 37).
Secondly the ICASA has inherited an industry with a past that has been both
constructive and detrimental at times. Constructive in the sense that there was a
strong drive towards providing infrastructure for the enablement of effective
broadcasting made possible by the financial support from government received
by the SABC but detrimental due to repressive media policies. To simply criticize
the regulator for certain glaring flaws, therefore, would be remiss without having a
full appreciation for the complexities with which it must contend. With regards to
the past; the ICASA must now 'level the playing field,14 as it were when it comes
14 This refers to the implementation of media policies that reflect a desire for the




to the distribution of resources and service delivery. It now has to ensure that all
sectors of society are catered for in an equally satisfying way; something that
was not a source of major concern for those responsible for regulating
broadcasting pre-1994. As one of the interviewees put it "ICASA is expected to
be God". They have to satisfy stakeholders on all sides. This means having to
ensure that the broadcasting industry in South Africa thrives by encouraging
competition and foreign investment while at the same time avoiding media
imperialism and promoting local content. Clearly, the ICASA has an extensive set
of mandates to which it must abide, which at times can be conflicting, therefore
placing it in the unenviable position of having to choose one over another. It is
therefore essential for such an organization to be absolutely clear about its
primary functions and purposes.
The obvious and elementary answer~to the question of what the ICASA's function
and purpose is, is that it should regulate. It is crucial, however, to go beyond this
blanket term 'regulation' and clearly define what it means to regulate to the
ICASA and how they go about achieving this. An interviewee15 stated that ICASA
regulates the industry by issuing licenses, he went on to say, "but before that we
do research within the industry. We look at gaps within the industry so as to
identify areas that require improvement". So the ICASA not only strives to ensure
that broadcasters for instance adhere to licensing conditions and other various
policies, it also works towards the development of the industry. According to
ICASA's own description, the Regulator has the mandate to:
o make regulations and policies that govern broadcasting and
telecommunications
o issue licenses to providers of telecommunication services and
broadcasters
15 Some senior managers of the ICASA were interviewed as part of the data collection exercise
carried out for this study.
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o monitor the environment and enforce compliance with rules, regulations
and policies
o hear and decide on disputes and complaints brought by industry or
members of
o the public against licensees
o plan, control and manage the frequency spectrum and
o protect consumers from unfair business practices, poor quality services
and harmful or inferior products16
Based on the above functions the ICASA is involved in formulating policies in
such a way that it promotes the development of the industry. It also monitors and
enforces compliance with these policies. Further, it mediates, manages and takes
on the role of public defender. In formulating regulations and policies the ICASA
goes through a process whereby research is conducted to determine which areas
-require attention. After such research has been carried out the authority then
proceeds to compile discussion papers which. are then published. This gives
stakeholders and the general public the opportunity to air their views. A position
paper is then produced based on the responses to the discussion paper.
Regulations, policies and sometimes license conditions are derived through this
process.
The Authority is guided mainly by the IBA Act when formulating policies or
performing any of its other abovementioned functions. The ideological principles
and stance adopted by the IBA Act will be discussed further in this section suffice




Principles of this nature can only be achieved by such an organization if it enjoys
a certain level of independence from government. An interviewee stated that "in
so far as broadcasting is concerned we are completely independent in the sense
that we develop regulations and policies and we implement those policies without
being approved by the Minister", Another interviewee pointed out that "In terms of
Section 13 of the IBA Act; we are meant to consult (with the Minister) but we
have the final say", The independence of the ICASA is therefore guaranteed by
the IBA Act in terms of the formulation of policies and regulations. The
independence of the Authority does come into question however when one
considers the fact that it is ultimately funded by treasury an extension of
government. In the financial year of 2004 the ICASA received R138 million which
was increased to R187 million in the financial year of 200517. The increase has
been attributed to the need for the settlement of the Authority's value added tax
liability. This is where the problem arises with such organizations, even in the
case of the SABC. If the ICASA cannot be funded by the government because
this will compromise its independence then how else can it be funded? If it were
to turn to industry it would be accused of bowing down to economic pressures.
The -only solution in such a case would be to have in place mechanisms to
ensure that government has no influence. In other words other political parties
especially opposition parties would have to be involved in the selection process
of candidates to be appointed to the ICASA particularly candidates in influential
positions. As it stands at the moment for example, the president nominates
candidates under the advisement of the National Assembly to undertake the role
of chairperson of the ICASA. There is little input from other political parties. This
implies that the government has carte blanche when it comes to the staff of the
independent regulator. Who is to say that the government won't ensure that the
position of ICASA chairman is occupied by someone whose ideological stance is
in line with that of the ruling party? Who's to say that such a situation won't hinder
principles of pluralism and free speech if these very principles in a particular case
can result in the tarnished image of the ruling party?
17http://www.info.gov.zalannualreportl2005/icasa_a_report05.pdf
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The SABC was involved in a situation which brought into question its
independence as a public broadcaster which is meant to serve the general public
of South Africa and not the ruling party. One can only wonder if the same is not
taking place at the ICASA. The situation involves the withdrawal of a
documentary which was feared to portray Mbeki negatively. The producers of the
documentary were even gagged and threatened with law suits if they uttered a
word to anyone regarding the content of the documentary. 18
The ICASA and certainly the SABC have ties with the government to some extent
or another and this therefore brings into question the notion of independence.
Can we legitimately talk of an independent regulator? According to the World
Book Dictionary (2000), independence means freedom from the control,
influence, support or illlliLof others. Given the above definition, it would be safe
to say that neither the ICASA nor the SABC can claim to be fully independent.
The purpose of this section was to discuss the changes that have taken place in
South Africa post-democracy particularly with regards to policy and to highlight
some of the new challenges that now face regulators and the country as whole
with the objective of then comparing these developments to those that have
taken place in Britain. Before that is done, however, it seems necessary to
discuss the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) in order to




The Public Service Ideal and the SABC
What is public service broadcasting?
Academics, various writers and organisations in the field have found it difficult to
agree on a clear definition of public service broadcasting. There is however a
relative consensus on the origins of the concept. One of the first people to coin
the term and conceptualise this notion was Lord John Reith (Director General of
BBC 1927-1938) who played a crucial role in the formation of the BBC which was
created "in order to protect and to exploit that national resource [frequency
spectrum] while at the same time, keeping a certain independence from
government" (McDonnell: 1991: 02). Reith conceived of public broadcasting as
having four dimensions. He believed that firstly, it should not be susceptible to
commercial influence; secondly it should serve the whole nation; thirdly it should
be organised as a monopoly; aFld finally it should meet high programming
standards (McDonnell: 1991). John Reith believed that the public broadcaster
had the responsibility to educate, inform and entertain members of its society.
Radio, according to Reith, was to be used as an instrument of enlightenment.
Freedom from commercial interests was of particular concern for John Reith and
perhaps the reason why he was so adamant in the belief that a public
broadcaster can only function optimally if it enjoys a monopolistic status. He was
opposed to competition in the form of private or commercial broadcasters as
these would oblige the public broadcaster to compete for audiences and result in
the compromising of quality and independence. As was observed -after the
introduction of commercial television in 1954 which provided audiences with a
popular alternative to the 'high standard' programming; the BBC was obliged to
"broaden its notion of public service broadcasting to justify a programme policy
that began actively to welcome some of the populist elements it had resisted for
so long" (McDonnell, 1991: 03)
Similar views to that of John Reith emerged later although perhaps not as
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extreme. Paddy Scannel (1989) believed that the fundamentally democratic
thrust of broadcasting should lie mits accessibility to virtually the whole spectrum
of public life. A public broadcaster should ideally not only be accessible but also
cater for all the different sectors of its society through a variety of programming
content. Alum Mpofu (1996); Ruth Teer-Tomaselli and Kwame Boafo (1996)
mention that a general consensus has emerged around eight basic principles and
objectives for public service broadcasting.
The first is geographic universality. As already mentioned, Public Service
Broadcasting must be available to every member of society regardless of their
remoteness and inaccessibility. The second principle is that of universal appeal.
It is crucial for PSB to provide a wide range of programming content in order to
service a diversity of public needs. Such a principle, particularly in South Africa,
with its wide range of cultural and linguistic groups becomes ever~more so
important and even more challenging to meet. This is more so the case from a
financial or economic point of view in a sense that catering for all sectors of
society, including minorities, might prove more expensive yet not particularly
profitable. The public broadcaster cannot, therefore, become obsessed with its
audience share because as soon as it does so, it loses sight of its role and
purpose and easily neglects minority interests. It is for this reason that public
broadcasters must not be dependent on advertisers for revenue.
Thirdly, there is to be universality of payment. The logic behind this principle is
that since the public broadcaster is to be accessible to all members of the society
they should all pay a fee for the service in order to ensure its survival.
Distance from vested interests is a crucial principle as the independence of the
public broadcaster is vital. There cannot be any undue influence over
programming provided by the broadcaster which may lead to the provision of
biased content. This is however difficult to achieve in practice. As history has
shown PSB is particularly susceptible to political interference especially during
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the 1980s and 1990s. The problem arises with the very concept of PSB. How is it
possible for a broadcaster, operating within a capitalist system where everything
and anything can only be made possible with the injection of capital, cater for all
and still be independent? Ultimately someone has to cover the operating
expenses and it is always going to be the state, advertisers or a combination of
both. The likelihood is that whoever pays will dictate the ways and means of
operation. Licence fees are unfortunately not enough to cover all the operating
costs.
According to Ruth Teer-Tomaselli (2005: 209) the success of the claim to political
independence depends on:
• The willingness of politicians to abstain from interfering with the
day-to-day running of the broadcaster.
• The ability of broadcasters to resist political interference by
remaining in control of the reporting and analysis of news and
content affairs.
• Public confidence: the acceptance by both pressure groups
(reviewers, commentators, political analysts, academics) and the
general public... that the broadcasting service is indeed
independent
Looking at these three points it becomes clear just how improbable it would be to
legitimately talk of an independent public broadcaster. With television now being
perceived as an agenda setter for political debate and as having influence on the
public profile of political parties (Mpofu: 1996) it is unlikely that politicians wili be
particularly willing to abstain from interfering, whether directly or indirectly, with
the daily running of public broadcasters in South Africa. Recently, the SABC
received major criticism from non-affiliated media and the public for failing to
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broadcast a scene whereby Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka was
booed offstage by a pro-Zuma (former Deputy President) ANC Youth League19.
The head of news and ex-ANC spokesperson responded by stating that their
cameraman was not present at the meeting and this explained why the SABC
had not broadcast the footage. This statement was however later falsified by
footage released by eTV showing the SABC cameraman at the meeting also
filming the incident.
The fifth principle is the special relationship to national identity and community. It
is important for a public broadcaster to cover events of national interest such as
general elections, state occasions and national sporting events. Under this
principle also falls the idea of the public broadcaster being responsible for
promoting a form of national identity. This can be seen as particularly important in
a country like South Africa which has experienced many years of deliberate
fragmentation and separation. The public broadcaster can now play its part in
unifying the country but-at the same time being very careful not to turn a blind
eye to certain negative activities such as government corruption for example in
the name of unification.
Minority interests should also be an important aspect of public broadcasting.
These interests should be catered for not only in terms of race but also in terms
gender, language and socio-economic status.
Programming quality
Since no theorist has succeeded in adequately defining the notion of quality as
an objective characteristic (Mpofu: 1996) the meaning and purpose of this
principle should lie in the commitment to provide programming that coincides with
the ethical commitments of public service philosophy. In this case the idea of
determining quality in terms of high and low culture which was how John Reith
seemed to determine programming quality is rejected as inappropriate.
19 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_African_Broadcasting_Corporation
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Editorial freedom is a problematic principle as with most if not all the
abovementioned principles. Based on this principle, editors/programme makers
should be able to do their jobs without interference from individuals, parties or
organizations with vested interests, provided they abide with the norms of media
professional ism.
To further explain public broadcasting Teer-Tomaselli (2005) mentions three
overlapping rubrics: broadcasting as a public utility, broadcasting in the public
sphere and broadcasting to serve the public as audience. Broadcasting as a
public utility views broadcasting as a necessary social service, which places the
responsibility of providing and maintaining a universal access network capable of
delivering broadcast services across the country on the shoulders of the national
broadcaster. Just as services such as electricity, water, basic education and
health care are provided for by the government in one way or another in many
countries, either at no profit or on a subsidised basis, within this paradigm, the
state is expected to play a similar role with regards to the provision of
broadcasting. The reception of these signals is thus treated as a necessity and
not a privilege or luxury.
Broadcasting in the public sphere requires that public service broadcasters view
its listeners/watchers as citizens rather than consumers. The aim should be to
inform them through the provision of accurate news and current affairs
programming. Once again the issue of impartiality is raised in this instance. The
purpose of PSB is perceived as the provision of "a space in which people are
able to receive information about, and to discuss and debate, issues of
importance to a political community, all of which enables them to participate in
society as informed citizens" (Teer-Tomaselli, 2005:204).
With regards to serving the public as an audience, the emphasis is on prioritising
the needs and aspirations of the listeners and viewers. The broadcaster is,
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therefore, expected to (in keeping with Reithian principles) educate, inform and
entertain. This means that there must be a commitment to balanced scheduling
across the different programme genres, in other words one institution should
cover the full spectrum of the public's needs and tastes. The issue of the
provision of local content is also highlighted in this paradigm as there are many
foreign (particularly American) programmes imported for South African television
due to the fact that it's actually cheaper than producing programmes locally. This,
therefore, aims to minimise a form of media and cultural imperialism through the
insistence on the production of local content and protection of the local industry.
These ideals of public service are simply guidelines for a model of a noble
nature. Like with most if not all models there is always the tendency to
experience major difficulties and unforeseen obstacles when it is time to
implement and put into practice what has been conceived in the minds of the
engineers of such models. It would therefore be misguided to conceive of these
ideals as static a.nd inflexible. They should serve as a reference point from which
alternative solutions can be derived when certain aspects meet some form of
resistance in practice. The concept of public service as an ideal model of
broadcasting has been increasingly questioned and to a certain extent even
considered no longer applicable to the contemporary broadcasting landscape
(particularly by supporters of the free market system). This point leads on to the
next section where I will discuss some of the shortfalls of the public service ideal
and the obstacles that challenge its rationale.
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The problem with public service broadcasting
Console Tleane and Jane Duncan20 (2003: 71) sate that:
The SABC has been forced into financial self-sufficiency, leading to an
ever-increasing dependency on advertising revenue, a source of funding
that has in-built biases towards historically privileged audiences (Console
Tleane and Jane Duncan, 2003: 71)
The concept of public service broadcasting as was conceived by Reith
particularly with his assumptions on what was best for society and his general
idea of running a public broadcaster can be considered (in a more contemporary
discourse) as perhaps too idealistic and essentialist. It can also be argued that
certain aspects of his conception of public service were plagued with many flaws
and have never been truly achieved even when looking at what has been termed
the model case of public service (the BBC) which was often accused of being
subservient to the government and catering mainly for the socially elite.
The assumption was that if you liked music you could not be displeased_
with Bach or Beethoven, and if you liked the theatre you could not be
discontented with Shakespeare. But many listeners did not greatly care for
these things and felt that the amount of air-time they occupied was not just
undemocratic but elitist. .. programmes of classical music or drama simply
reflected the values of those at the higher end of the social scale. (Crisell,
1997: 28).
Reith presumed to know what the public needed and took it upon himself to
provide this, overlooking the fact that listeners/viewers are not a passive and
homogeneous mass. It can also be claimed that his idea of good or high standard
programming as he wanted to provide was rather narrow, after all it can be
agreed that this by its (very nature) is a rather subjective notion. It was ultimately
20
Console Tleane and Jane Duncan work for the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) a liberal think tank dedicated to
the maximisation of diversity and plurality of political views. The FXI strongly opposes the neo-Iiberal agenda of
corporatisation, which they see as attacking the very basis and rationale of public service broadcasting
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an elitist notion which isolated a significant portion of the population. However,
some of these flaws were later acknowledged and addressed by successors of
Reith.
The difficulty with public broadcasting lay not only with internal contradictions but
also with external factors; after all PSB never did and never will exist in a
vacuum. Historically, the main challenge facing public broadcasters was political
interference. In more recent times the challenges facing public broadcasters have
come to include the extensive commodification/commercialisation of the media
industry. This is what Alum Mpofu (1996: 17) refers to as "a striking invasion of
the cultural and informational sphere by economic interests." It is these economic
interests that complicate the PSB problem even further.
The development of new technologies in the field of broadcasting has resulted in
an increasing amount of media products and producers which has in turn
resulted in more intense competition for public broadcasters. They no longer
enjoy the monopoly status they used to in the past. The increase in competition
has forced public broadcasters to focus more on strategies for increasing their
audience share and gaining the attention of advertisers rather than trying to fully
live up to their public service ideals. In the case of the SABC this is particularly
alarming considering that according to Ruth Teer-Tomaselli (2005) more than 85
per cent of SABC operating revenue is derived from advertising. The BBC, to this
day, has no advertising at all. This goes to demonstrate how strong the presence
of commercial interests is within the SABC and the severity of the problem. The
implications of such a dependency on advertising stand in sharp contrast to the
ideals and principles of public service broadcasting. This therefore calls for an
urgent evaluation of pUblic service funding models partiCUlarly in developing
countries where there aren't many financial resources to invest in PSB.
To further delineate the factors that influence PSB, I'd like to refer to the
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following. Based on a synthesis of the discussions held during the International
Round Table on the Cultural and Educational Functions of Public Service
Broadcasting (IRTCEFPSB) (Teer-Tomaselli and Soafo 1996: 184) the crisis now
faced by public service broadcasters can be attributed to a number of factors or
even global trends:
1. Market forces have been favoured by ideological and political
tendencies in an age of 'information capitalism', and the competition
makes public service broadcasting institutions appear as liabilities
on the public purse;
ll. Rising costs and inflation, taken together with falling revenue from
licensing and market share, have tested governments commitment
to provide continued adequate funding;
Ill. New technologies, most notably digital signal compression and
editing as well as cable and satellite signal distribution, have
undermined the concept of spectrum scarcity as a rationale for
regulation
IV. The ideal of a national broadcasting system as a mainstay of
indigenous culture is undermined by the disparity between the low
cost of imported programmes and the high cost of indigenous
productions
To make matters worse:
[T]here are those among supporters of the free market philosophy who
believe that only the market can ensure the necessary freedom from state
control and coercion. Therefore, any system of broadcasting that is
supported by the state, in whatever form, is seen to be open to abuse and
possible censorship or propaganda (Teer-Tomaselli, 2005: 200).
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It seems, therefore, that there is a strong desire to see some form of a phasing
out process of PSB due to the growing perception of this concept as obsolete or
perhaps out-dated and therefore no longer necessaiY as highlighted by Alum
Mpofu (1996): "Because of the seemingly endemic problems facing PSB, free
market arguments have been advanced as superior organising models for
broadcasting, plunging the legitimacy of PSB into further crisis".
However, such a perception would be misguided to an extent since a free market
system is not without its own faults. Markets have a tendency of not producing,
high quality and in sufficient quantity, the less popular but essential programming
in education, research, children's programming (other than in cartoons), dramas
in minority languages and other specialised programming (Teer-Tomaselli, 2005).
Essentially market-driven models tend to cater less for the minorities or the
socially under-privileged. The responsibility of PSB is thus ~great and it is
essential that it lives up to these expectations. Console Tleane and Jane Duncan
(2003:27-28) further illustrate this point when they mention that "market failure
was patently obvious as laissez-faire capitalism led to the uneven distribution of
goods and services based on class: hence the development of regulation". The
following section is a discussion of some of the challenges that the SABC in
particular has had to deal with as a public service broadcaster, particularly in the
context of an ensuing change in political climate and function as a public
broadcaster in a democratic dispensation.
A Case of the SABC
The Restructuring Process
The following section will take a closer look at the SABC beginning with a
discussion of the restructuring process. The section will demonstrate that certain
decisions and courses of action taken during this time might have been
unintentionally detrimental to public service broadcasting values.
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The restructuring of the SABC began in the 1980s when the then management
divided the Corporation into business units. The Triple Inquiry report played a
major role in the further restructuring of the SABC which came about as a result
of the IBA Act (of 1993) when it called for "... investigations into the viability of
public broadcasting, cross media ownership rules, and local content
provisions... " (Horwitz, 2001). The report recommended that public service
broadcasting be funded through a mixed system constituted by advertising and
sponsorship, licence fees, government grants and other forms of income such as
the merchandising of products and leasing of facilities (Tleane and Duncan,
2003). For radio, the report recommended the licensing of eleven full spectrum
language stations and "the sale of eight regional stations; Lotus, Good Hope,
KFM, Algoa and its split, BRFM, and RRN East Coast, Orange (and its split
Goudveld), Highveld and Jacaranda (and its split RMFM)" (Tleane and
Duncan, 2003: 61). After the Triple Inquiry was presented to the government the
following changes occurred. Eleven stations (Ukhozi, Umhlobo Wenene,
Ikwekwezi , Ligwalagwala, Motsweding, Lesedi, Thobela, _ Phalaphala,
Munghana Lonene, SAfm and Radio Sonder Grense) remained under the
SABC while three (Metro fm, 5fm, and Lotus fm) were converted into public
commercial service stations.
In 1997 the first Green Paper on broadcasting in South Africa was released and
it recommended two models for the transformation of the SABC, the first model
being that of a traditional public broadcasting charter like the BBC. The second
proposed model was to corporatise the SABC and have it run like a public
company with the state as the sole shareholder. The preferred model by the
government was the corporatisation of the SABC and this was outlined in the
Broadcasting Act 4 (of 1999). In 2000 the SABC was divided into commercial and
non-commercial arms. The intention was for the commercial arm to cross~
subsidise the public service functions of the non-commercial arm. This move was
also aimed at limiting the dependence of the SABC on government funding since
the government's willingness to fund the SABC was becoming increasingly
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doubtful. The effects of this however do not look positive. After the
corporatisation process had barely begun the SABC took the decision to close its
offices in Thohoyandou, Umtata and Giyani for cost reasons and relocated the
staff to Pietersburg and Port Elizabeth. These offices provided over eighty
percent of the content for public service radio stations like Phalaphala and
Munghana Lonene; this is no longer the case. When commenting on this
incident Jane Duncan (2001: 29) me-ntions that" ... this move on the part of the
SABC could be seen as an attempt to disinvest further in already marginalized
language groups". One wonders also as to whether the mixed model with the
idea of cross-subsidisation is really working; "PBS stations are increasingly
coming under pressure to attract more advertising revenue. This suggests that
the cross-subsidisation model is notworking" (Tleane and Duncan, 2003: 125).
The SABC has undergone a significant amount of restructuring in an attempt to
live up to the more socio-democratically inclined principles -of public service but
also at the same time making attempts to remain commercially viable and
competitive due to economic pressures. The brief discussion on the restructuring
of the SABC has been an attempt at demonstrating that the public broadcaster is
characterised by practices that are potentially detrimental to public service
broadcasting values. The question of whether the restructuring undertaken has
been a step forward or not can be answered by comparing the SABC's
performance to the eight principles discussed earlier.
Geographic Universality
The public broadcaster is meant to reach all members of a given society,
regardless of geographic location. This requires an extensive amount of
infrastructure and can be rather difficult to achieve particularly with a big country.
The SABC has been making efforts to meet this demand and
[S]ince 1999 until 2003, ten new transmitters have been making SABC
radio available to 2, 7 million more people. Plans are on track to activate
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three more transmitters for Lesedi FM21 and Ukhozi. Transmitter
expansion for SABC 1 and SABC 2 has been approved by ICASA to reach
more people. On completion the SABC 1 footprint will increase from 83%
to 89%, SABC 2 from 85% to 91%22.
As far as radio PSB is concerned, it reaches approximately 74 percent of the
adult population of South Africa. Clearly there are still some pockets of society
that are not being serviced by the SABC. It is encouraging though that an effort is
being made and perhaps in the future this will cease to be an issue.
Universal appeal
The SABC is making efforts with regard to universal appeal, particularly the
provision of news in the various official languages. Despite the obvious changes
the SABC has made since the old apartheid regime it is still criticised for not
catering for certain sectors of the population. Numerous academics and
commentators have expressed concern over the significant dependence of the
SABC on advertising (Halt, 1996; Mpofu, 1996; Tleane and Duncan, 2003; Teer-
Tomaselli, 2005;) due to fact that advertising as a source of revenue that targets
particular audiences runs counter to one of the fundamental tenants of public
broadcasting, namely, to target audiences universally. One can deduce from this
statement that due to the very fact that the SABC relies so heavily on advertising
makes it incapable of targeting audiences universally.
The issue of a public service broadcaster relying on revenue gained from
advertising is to be taken very seriously because if one were to take note of the
fact that approximately 35 percent of the population attracts 68 percent of ad
spend on the top four [LSM 6-10] (Tleane and Duncan, 2003: 70) it becomes
clear which sectors of society will be prioritised by the broadcaster at the
expense of the lower LSM. One couldn't be too far from being correct if he/she
21 South African indigenous language radio stations
22 http://ww.sabc.co.za/portal/site/menuitem.1 c307ed6a93b5447f37146125401 aeb9/
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were to conclude by saying that the SABC has simply made a transition from
racial discrimination to a more subtle economic form of discrimination.
Universality of payment
South Africa has a history of license payment defaulting and it is noted that since
1992 up until recently licensed television sets were declining by a hundred
thousand a year. In January 1998, the SABC mentioned that as much as six out
of ten households were 'pirate viewers,23. The SABC has since undergone an
aggressive campaign to encourage South Africans to pay their television licenses
with the catch phrase 'It's the right thing to do'. Such commercials were
broadcast regularly on SABC television. The SABC set out to track non-paying
users with a device that could somehow detect whether a certain household was
operating an unlicensed television set or not. The SABC would even go to the
extent of sending some aefaulters letters notifying them of the fact that they had
been identified as 'pirate viewers' and threatening legal action. This technique did
not seem to be working and the SABC changed its approach and offered people
who had television sets but had never obtained a license the opportunity to do so
without having to pay for the time since the purchase of their television sets. The
same amnesty was not however shown to those in arrears. This problem makes
it more challenging for the SABC to perform is duties because it loses out on a
substantial amount of revenue each year. There are approximately six million
television sets form which licenses could be obtained in the country, but only
three point six million of these appear on the SABC database. Of this 3.6 million,
one point seven million regularly pay their TV licenses, but the number of payers
is expected to rise to two million within a year. This lack of co-operation simply
aggravates the economic crisis that the SABC finds itself in.
23 http://www.cbn.co.za/archive/98-jan/sateIli3.htm
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Distance from vested interests
South African media policy demonstrates a great wariness of vested interests
particularly where broadcasting is concerned even for commercial broadcasters.
The IBA Act stipulates that foreign persons or organisations may only obtain no
more than a twenty percent share of any South African commercial broadcaster.
As far as the public broadcaster is concerned the State is the only shareholder.
One could argue that this places the independence of the SABC into great
question. The very fact that Snuki Zikalala (a known ANC figure) is head of news
at the SABC is indication of this. To further create cause for concern; he has on
occasion been involved in cases where he has been seen to use his position to
protect the interests of the ANC. Political influence in the SABC is arguably still
present. However, Tleane and Duncan, 2003: 95 believe that
While there are arguments to the extent that being dependent on the
state can render public broadcasting [manipulatable] by political forces,
particularly if we take South Africa's history of total state control into
consideration, it is also undeniable that in the same way that the state
has to fund education, health, welfare and many other special services,
public broadcasting must be funded by the state.
Besides political influence, economic influence is probably the public
broadcaster's greater challenge and it manifests itself in the form of the
broadcaster's dependence on advertising and thus greatly compromises its
position as a public broadcaster. According to Duncan (2001: 27), "The
Corporation has always been inordinately dependent on advertising, relative to
other public (and even state) broadcasters in other countries. This reality has and
still does severely curtail the corporation's ability to become a bona fide public
broadcaster". Certain SABC radio stations have undergone a gradual
transformation towards a more commercially motivated position. A case in point
is Thobela FM which changed its programming content after conducting market
research that revealed that it would benefit more if its programming was geared
more towards serving the interests of urban, upwardly mobile listeners rather
than the rural, illiterate, and poor listeners who happened to be the traditional and
loyal listeners of the station (Holt, 1996; Tleane and Duncan, 2003).
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The issue of PSB funding in South Africa is a complex problem with no quick
solution. If one were to agree with Tleane and Duncan, then one would have to
insist on a more effective means of ensuring that the state funding of PSB did not
translate into state influence. At least this way the broadcaster would be free from
economic influence. However, looking at the current trends around the world it
does not seem as though this a likely option; "Faced with ever decreasing
subsidies from governments many public broadcasters have been forced to
reposition themselves in ways that make them eventually serve the interests of
capital rather than the interests of the public" (Tleane and Duncan, 2003: 95).
Special relationship to national identity and community
The Broadcasting (Act of 1999) mentions that public service is "... necessary for
the maintenance of national identity, universal access, equality, unity and
diversity... " (Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999: 01). The SABC is thus charged with the
responsibility of broadcasting events of national interest such as national team
matches, presidential inaugurations and so forth. The SABC broadcasts a fair
amount -of national team matches and occasions and has been seen to contribute
to the creation of a national identity through various initiatives.
As public broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation
(SABC) has apparently assumed some responsibility for communicating
the message of national unity. This is epitomised by the repetitive jingle
on SABC-TV: "Simunye - We are one". The content of certain radio and
television programmes, and even some private sector funded
advertisements convey the message of nation building. For instance,
South African Breweries who are the chief sponsors of the national
soccer team (the Bafana Bafana) have promoted Castle Lager with the
slogan "One Beer, One Nation". As cultural carriers, the media have




Since the SABC relies on advertising it can be argued that programming on its
channels will reflect the interests of those mainly targeted by advertisers and in
South Africa these would be groups falling into LSMs 6-10. According to Tleane
and Duncan "With respect to television, 44 percent of the population attracts 60
percent of ad spend" (2003:70). It is clear that the SABC is forced to prioritise
people falling into higher LSMs despite that it is a public broadcaster. Certain
SABC radio stations have even repositioned themselves in order to attract more
lucrative audiences:
Thobela FM effected programme changes with this in mind. The station
changed its programmes after 'market research' indicated that it would
benefit much more if the nature and content of programming was skewed
to suit the interests of urban, upwardly mobile listeners rather than the
rural, illiterate and poor listeners who happened to be the traditional and
loyal listeners of the station (Tleane and Duncan, 2003: 98).
Programming quality
Production costs are exorbitantly high for television programmes; it is usually
more affordable to purchase these from other countries already made. With the
SABC having to be financially independent, its public service mandate which
requires more locally produced programmes places an even greater strain on its
financial resources. As a result the quality of programming is inevitably
compromised. Most of the television programmes made locally mainly come in
the form of current affairs and actuality. The other slots, namely film, drama
series and comedy, are dominated by poor quality American made products
Tleane and Duncan, 2003)
When it comes to news as part of programming Russell Baker (1996:215) claims
that "... the absence of investigative and fresh news on the SABC is often
highlighted." The absence of investigative and fresh news is often attributed to an
over-dependence on news wire services which results in the reception of news
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stories that have already been covered. Ultimately such a phenomenon is the
result of poor editorial practices but more interestingly; financial constraints.
Editorial freedom
Editorial freedom is a critical point because one could argue that this is where the
media are most vulnerable to influence. As already demonstrated in the case of
Snuki Zikalala such influence is present in the SABC although not as blatantly as
in the apartheid era. As pointed out by Tleane and Duncan, (2003: 11 0) certain
stories are suppressed by the editors themselves for political reasons;
A more comprehensive coverage of the story was allegedly suppressed by
some editors who apparently felt that the story was an embarrassment to
the South African government, leading to one journalist stating that he felt
like "calling the international media to cover the story because we
ourselves were incapacitated."
It is clear that the SABC has made some improvements but there are still many
problems and areas where it falls short and thus makes it difficult to talk of the




The paper has thus far discussed the differences between the South African and
the British broadcasting landscape briefly and mainly from an historical
perspective. The aim at this juncture is t-o engage in a brief comparative
discussion of the broadcasting policies from the two countries on a more
contemporary note.
Before 1996 in Britain there were as many as four different regulatory bodies
dealing with different aspects of broadcasting; the Broadcasting Standards
Commission, the Independent Television Commission and the radio authority
whereas in South Africa the Independent Broadcasting Authority saw to most of
the issues relating to broadcasting although there was the South African
Broadcasting Standards Authority as well. One wonders whether the BI''itish
system was run more effectively due to the existence of multipl-e regulatory
bodies or not especially considerin-g the fact that radio and television had their
own separate regulatory authorities. As digitization and convergence became
increasingly pertinent issues, requiring prompt attention, the rationale became
that of consolidation.
An interesting contrast between the two countries is the fact that in Britain there
is a greater emphasis on Iiberarlisation and a move towards deregulation as
compared to the South African case. This could be attributed to the fact that
South Africa is lagging behind Britain in terms of development, since it is after all
considered by some as still a developing country, and therefore must have
different goals in terms of broadcasting compared to Britain. After all the unique
needs and objectives of a country and the factors relevant to that country or
society will/should ultimately inform policy decisions (Servaes 1999). Britain's
policies are more market orientated and they tend to promote the notion of
liberating broadcasters in order to allow them to compete on a global scale
because due to technological progress other countries can now easily broadcast
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in Britain. Since trying to find ways of preventing trans-border broadcasting is
more complex a problem to deal with, it is considered a better option to ensure to
that they are able to compete globally. South Africa, on the other hand finds itself
in a situation, in which it wishes to improve its competitive standing within the
global economy, and therefore is to some extent drawn to policies of
liberalisation; but cannot fully commit due to resistance to the wholesale
transfoimation to a market driven economy (Teer-Tomaselli, 2005).
A disturbing similarity is that although the Office of Communications (Ofcom) has
a slightly more complex structure of governance in terms of the constitution of the
board of executive and non-executive members and advisory board committees
as compared to that of the ICASA, board members of both regulators are
appointed by the President which puts into question their state of independence.
The question of independence is also brought into question on the grounds of
funding. The ICASA in particular is funded by treasury which is an extension-of
government.
The seemingly decreasing importance of pluralism and diversity in Britain as
indicative in the 1996 Broadcasting Act is also a point of contrast in comparison
to South African policy on this issue. While the media policies in Britain are
market driven one could argue that the South African policies are more culturally
and socio-politically motivated. To illustrate this point one need only look at the
fact that the ownership rules in South Africa haven't been relaxed as much as
they have been in Britain. In South Africa there is also the consideration of the
fact that there are eleven official languages and the Broadcasting Act of 1999
calls for equitable treatment of all languages. Clearly British media policy makers
have adopted a 'light touch' approach where South Africa's display a greater
concern for issues of ownership and control and diversity/pluralism.
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Conclusion
The challenge of achieving a balance between serving the interests of the public
and simultaneously meeting the demands of industry has existed for decades
and still proves to be an illusive goal. Despite this it is one that must be tirelessly
sought after especially in a country such as South Africa. In a highly contested
environment such as broadcasting; it is easy to overlook the interests of those
that don't have the economic or political might to create a platform on which to
express their views, opinions and cultural beliefs and thus risk the prospect of
slipping into oblivion.
History has demonstrated that those who do not own the means of production
easily fall prey to oppression and dependence on the 'master' and are therefore
opened up to exploitation, degradation and eventually a loss of identity and self-
respect. This is a detrimental result for any society and thus cannot be allowed to
take place without efforts to curb this process. The existence of public
broadcasters thus becomes. a crucial element in this respect
Unfortunately it is not simply the existence of public broadcasters that remedies
this problem because public broadcasters by their very nature are vulnerable to a
multitude of external forces since they do not function within a vacuum. As
expressed by early theorists of political economy the government "bore special
watchfulness because the tradition of sovereignty, which gave it power to defend
the realm, could easily be used to create special privileges... " (Mosco, 1996: 40).
The study has thus discussed the uncomfortable relationship between public
broadcasters and the state. It has become clear throughout the course of my
research that as much as there needs to be distance between the state and the
public broadcaster, there is an inescapable bond between the government and
the public broadcaster because of funding: If the public broadcaster is expected
to fund itself and rely increasingly on capitalist principles it becomes no different
to a commercial broadcaster. More often than not; programming reflects the
funding method. The question that subtly runs the course of the study is: How
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does one separate funding from programming?
The existence of regulators should be the answer to this question and to some
extent has been. The unfortunate instance in the South African context is that the
independence (which is a critical factor in the effective functioning of the
authority) of the regulator comes into question on a number of levels as
discussed in the study. What has worked for Britain is the in terms of their public
broadcaster is the fact that they do not have advertising and therefore do not fall
prey to market pressures because citizens pay a rather significant television
licence fee. In the South African case this is not a feasible solution due to a
significant portion of the population who simply wouldn't afford a licence fee
increase. The SABC is struggling to attain the low licence fees as it is. The best
solution therefore when it comes to public broadcasters and regulators is that
there be a stipulation stating that people who sit on the board of councils in such
organisations be representative of a number of political parties particQlarly the
opposition party. The appointments of such people should also be the made by
parliament as a whole and not the just the President.
The paper has discussed a theoretical approach into the discussion of
broadcasting regulation where there was a focus on three aspects of political
economy, commodification which explains why it is important to have regulators
since as a result of it companies and organizations may tend to ignore public
interest and function only to service market interests. The second was
spatialization which looks at the media from a technological point of view and
how this technology compresses space and time allowing, for example through
satellite television, a broadcaster to transmit a particular event internationally
simUltaneously. The implications of such (one of which being media and cultural
imperialism) are immense and therefore require the attention of regulators.
Structuration was also discussed in terms of human agency and how as result
the structure can perpetuate practices detrimental to the public interest.
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The study has focused solely on broadcasting and has discussed the importance
of regulation in the industry including the challenges in doing so. i have drawn
comparisons between the British model and that of South Africa order to
ascertain a way forward for South African broadcasting.
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Interviews conducted with members of staff from the ICASA
Interviewee.1
What are the primary functions of the ICASA?
We regulate the industry by issuing licences, but before that we do research
within the industry. We look at gaps within the industry so as to identify areas that
require improvement. So from research we move onto discussion papers. which
are published, and we then get views from the various stakeholders and
community at large. From that you then get a position paper. From that position
paper you can then get regulations and sometimes licensing conditions. So that
is one area; we look at gaps through research and have discussions and then
develop policies. The other way of regulating is by issuing licences to
broadcasters and also by investigating the categories of the broadcasting sector
which have not been developed. For example if we think that community
broadcasting has not been developed well, we then look at how we can develop
it. Recently we've been busy with the nodal points, so if we feel that the rural
areas have not been served well we then through licensing issue licences for
those areas. So basically its regulation and then contributing towards the
development of the industry. We regulate in the public's interest.
What are the guiding principles that the ICASA uses when regulating?
The IBA Act has a list of guiding principles; for example the upliftment of
previously disadvantaged communities. We look at diversity; there are quite a
number of them its just that I can't remember all of them but they are listed in
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section 2 of the Act.
Which other organizations does the ICASA consult or interact with regards
regulatory duties?
The broadcasters themselves, basically organisations formed by the
broadcasters, the Department of Communications. Then you have a number of
stake holders in the industry like the National Community Radio Forum, the
Media Development Agency the Freedom of Expression Institute. So you have
the organizations which cater for the interests of the industry and the interests of
the public such as NGO'S. We also communicate with the community at large.
What is the nature of your relationship with the Portfolio Committee on
Communications?
Well I can't say much about that but they are -the portfolio committee in
parliament, they are an oversight committee in parliament. So we from time to
time account to parliament for our policies, the operations of our organization.
That committee sometimes conducts hearings regarding legislation. At the
moment we have legislation in the pipeline, in fact it's a bill. It's called the ICASA
bill. That Committee doesn't only consult with us; it consults with broader
stakeholders in the industry.
Can you elaborate a little more on your relationship with the Department of
Communications?
In so far as broadcasting is concerned we are completely independent in the
sense that we develop regulations and policies and we implement those policies
without being approved by the Minister. The DOC in our case is mainly a
stakeholder but as we know they are vested with the powers of developing
legislation around broadcasting but we then implement that legislation and the
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policies.
How is the ICASA funded?
We get funding from the treasury although I'm not the right person to comment
this.
What is ICASA'S position with regards to the trend towards deregulation?
I can't comment much on that as I'm not the right person perhaps the policy
department can answer that question. Safe to say, however, that ICASA had
recommended to parliament to relax regulations around ownership.
Can you briefly comment on why there are still areas in the country that
aren't receiving radio signals?
Again I'm not in a position to answer that question. I'm sure the policy department
will be more equipped at answering that question.
Do you feel that the SABC as a public broadcaster is meeting its
requirements?
We have not been monitoring the SABC closely, the reason being that the
licensing conditions we had for the SABC were very superfluous. They were not
very specific. We have recently re-issued the amended licensing conditions for
the SABC, which are detailed in terms of their mandate. We will now start making
sure that they comply with those conditions because it's difficult to monitor
compliance with a mandate without guiding principles or specific conditions. We
also look at each individual radio station and TV channel because, remember,
each radio station will have its specific stipulations for example uKhozi has a
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specific group which it targets in terms of language and area and its conditions
will also be different for example from SAfm.
What about the fact that the SABC still relies heavily on advertising for
revenue even though it's a public broadcaster?
Obviously it would seem as though there is conflict of interest where the
advertisers may end up driving the mandate of the SABC because of the
percentage they contribute towards their revenue. It shouldn't be like that but
again what I'm telling you is based on the perception that I have its not based on
research. Unfortunately I cannot answer authoritatively on that. Perhaps the
research department can help you there or the licensing department.
Could you possibly elaborate on the concept of public-commercial
broadcasting and why it has come about?
It would be for example 5 fm. It's a broadcaster of the SABC but like Metro fm it
has a commercial interest. SABC 3 is another example. It has a public mandate
because SABC has a public mandate but mainly it helps the SABC to raise
funds.
Is the fact that it's relying on some form of commercial means not a
problem with regards to its public mandate again going back to that
question?
I wouldn't say so because there's a clear division now. It's not like in the past
where it was not clear; where a station would adopt a commercial structure
whereas it's supposed to be public. Now it's clear so if you licence a station you
know it has a commercial imperative or a public one. The aim also is to help raise
funding; to subsidise the public branch.
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In your OpiniOn, would you say the South African broadcasting media
industry is diverse and has achieved pluralism?
Yes, I think it has come a long way. I think it is diverse since it caters for the
different needs of communities. I think that now within the community sector we
have Christian radio stations for example, I mean religious radio stations. So you
have radio stations which cater for the Muslim religion you have those who cater
for the Christian religion and those who cater for a particular culture. These are
public interest radio stations, radio stations serving communities of interest
instead of geographical. There is diversity and within each broadcaster for
example diversion of news is promoted so you can't have a radio station which
focuses on one area.
There is a long way to go, but in terms of marginalised languages there is
something being done. That's why we now have SABC four and five to cater for
those although they haven't been licensed as yet.
Due to increased competition as a result of the introduction of community
stations and other similar factors; some broadcasters have called for a
more liberalised media industry especially with regards to media ownership
and control. What is the ICASA'S position on this issue?
ICASA is for competition but again you have to do your research and check
whether the particular community or area is ready for that kind of competition. For
example you can't lump KwaZulu-Natal in the same basket as Gauteng and give
them competition they cannot handle. ICASA is for competition, we have always
argued for the relaxation of ownership rules.
Is there any situation in which the Department of Communications would
be in a position to overrule a certain policy you may have decided to
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implement?
I can't think of any, in fact this hasn't happened.
Interviewee no. 2
What are the key conditions or requirements that commercial broadcasters
must meet in order to be granted a licence?
They must have funds, they must comply with ownership rules and regulations
and also licensing conditions.
What are your guiding principles when deciding on whether to issue a
licence to an applicant or not?
The main guiding principle is that of- diversity. We want to ensure that there is
diversity especially with community broadcasting.
When it comes to commercial broadcasters; diversity can be a little trickier
to achieve how do you deal with this sector of the industry?
The trick there is to try and balance the interests of their target market with the
licensing conditions.
M-net has an open window which is a period from 5pm to 7pm where
viewers without M-net decoders can watch its programmes. This is a cause
for concern for other broadcasters such as e-TV for example because
during this time they have to compete for non-subscribing viewers with a
subscription broadcaster. What has the ICASA decided to do about this?
The authority has ruled that the window be closed because of the very fact that it
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becomes unfair for M-net which is a subscription broadcaster to compete with e-
TV and the SABC both of which are free-to-air broadcasters.
What is your position as the ICASA with regards to the global trend
towards deregulation?
That question would be better answered by the policy department.
Interviewee no.3
What other institutions does the ICASA consult with in carrying out its
functions?
It depends on the area but in principle we do consult a lot with the stakeholders
either informally in the process of developing legislature or formally through a
section 28 inquiry. Remember I mentioned earlier on we issue out a discussion
document where people are then given 30 days to respond and in addition to that
we also have public hearings where people that have indicated during the
response period that they want to give oral hearings are given this chance. We
also consult with government or other departments. We are specifically required
by section 28 to consult with the Minister of Communications when we finalise
our regulation process. We also interact with self-regulatory bodies and industry
bodies, the self-regulatory bodies that we would interact with would be the
Advertising Standards Authority in matters that relate to the regulation of
advertising, the Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa which
relates to broadcasting content and the code of conduct related regulation issues.
We also have a memorandum of understanding with the competition commission
in as far as dealing with market and competition issues is concerned. In the
telecommunications side I think the competition imperatives are a lot broader. In
terms of broadcasting we've tended to have been confined to mergers and
acquisitions. We also have a memorandum of understanding with the Media
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Diversity and Development Agency (MDDA), what the MDDA is meant to do is to
promote the growth of smaller media enterprises or organizations across the
board ranging from community newspapers and radio stations and television.
Their mandate is a lot broader but the way in which we perceive it is that they
also assist in terms of assessing or diversity mandate and also our development
and access mandate, we have working relationship with them. There are two
examples that I can point out where we had to deal with other departments as far
as South African content development is concerned. We tried having a
commissioning forum and one for musicians where we looked at developing,
even though this wasn't really our area because remember we deal with
broadcasting, not publication or production but the quotas that we set influence
production and impact on the recording industry and so we have a relationship
with the Department of Arts and Culture through an initiative called Bushito which
is aimed towards developing the South African music industry in its totality; the
whole va~ue chain. That is why we set quotas in terms of what we expect with
regards to the amount of South African music played by radio stations. Obviously
according to their regulatory mandate; we also want to impact on that production
process.
In terms of the final decision; how much power would the Minister of
Communications have with regards to the implementation of policies?
In terms Section 13 of the IBA Act; we are meant to consult (with the Minister) but
we have the final say. We haven't found ourselves in a situation where we are at
loggerheads because obviously we are working towards the same goal but
Section 13 does give us the final say. She can set policy direction but she has to
consult with us. It's a good working relationship; I always emphasise functional
independence. We work towards the same policy goal but she's supposed to set
the overarching policy and we're supposed to set the micro policy whereas she
deals with macro policy. This emanates from the bottom-up. Section 28 enables it
to work from the bottom-up.
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50 what you find is that you are always working in parallel with the
Minister?
There's hardly ever any duplication, there could be duplication in terms of the
area but in terms of the approach... remember the Minister sets policy that cuts
across, we deal with policy that'l! enable us to enforce. There's never been a
directive that came from the top-down, there's section 13 which allows for that to
happen but it's always been from the bottom-up. We make recommendations, we
make regulations. So there are three areas in the IBA act that we need to look
into in this regard, section 13 which talks about the powers of the Minister and
the powers of the regulator and the working relationship between them section 78
gives us the power to make regulations, section 28 which gives us as the
regulator the power to initiate the policy process inclusive of a public inquiry.
What is your position as the ICA5A with regards to the global trends
towards increased concentration on the one hand and deregulation on the
other?
We have section 48, 49 and 50. We've reviewed the way in which its relevance
might impact on the digitalised environment we still believe that we should work
towards media diversity, its one of our regulatory imperatives. Section 2 says that
we should work for a diverse and independent media environment, especially a
broadcasting environment. What we've done in terms of the review is that we've
actually relaxed it somewhat in the sense that we've allowed for a bigger
proportion and we've also included a discretionary clause that could allow for
more foreign investment. Obviously in a converged environment, there are going
to be more challenges either than just circulation. Remember it's based on the
circulation of newspapers. There could be other platforms that come into play but
in as far as it's the law; it remains the law. The difference might be in how you
implement it and how you would consider other aspects. One of the things that
112
we looked at is how it would impact on the digitalised environment.
Why is it that certain areas are still not receiving radio and television
signals within South Africa, is it a question of viability or infrastructure?
It's a mixture of all of the above. Its mostly infrastructure which is the underlying
reason but when the PBS was licensed and the Triple Inquiry came into being
there were percentages that broadcasters were meant to have covered as part of
the licensing conditions. Some of the things the technical department should be
measuring are to see how far. But there'lI always be those gaps. One of the
things that we've allowed as a legacy and which we're in the process of reviewing
is the existence of self-help stations. Self-help stations are like re-transmitters,
because part of the problem of areas not receiving coverage could either be the
fact that the topography is such that you would need to have an additional
transmitter to be put in that place for people to receive and it would not make
economic sense for the broadcaster to set up another transmitter and so in the
mean time self-help stations can serve as a temporary measure to allow people
to receive. So like I said it's a mixture of the above, sometimes it doesn't make
economic sense, but economic sense for the PBS should not be the major
determinant. There should be plans or indications of when signals should reach
those places. Sentech has the obligation of ensuring that universal access
happens.
So there is something being done about it?
There is something being done about it, but like I said we're reviewing the self-
help station policy to ensure that it reaches the goal which is to be a temporary
measure until such time that universal access takes place, but all broadcasters
have obligations. If you look at the
e-TV licence, there are certain areas that they have to cover.
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In your personal opinion; do you believe that the SABC meets its mandate
as a public broadcaster?
I would say that its in the process of meeting its mandate, obviously the picture
that's being presented right now is based on the licence conditions that it had in
June this year we amended the licence conditions. What the licence amendment
process is meant to do is to clearly distinguish the extent to which the SABC
would operate as a commercial concern and the extent to which it is to operate
as a public broadcaster. The broadcasting act allows the SABC to be divided into
two divisions one that is a public broadcaster and one that is a commercial
broadcaster. The division is mainly meant to be an organizational division not a
licensing division. The licensee needs to be SABC but what the licensing division
does is that it places certain programming obligations on pure PBS system, the
PBS side but the PBS is not supposed to be threatened by commercial concerns
but to enable SABC to be able to tap into the advertising revenue market then
there are certain channels that are meant to operate on a purely commercial
basis to be driven by audiences, to be driven by advertising imperatives but at
the same time the division is meant to be in such a way that the commercial
side, funds the PBS side but the PBS side cannot cross-subsidise the
commercial side. In a nutshell; even though in some aspects in terms of the
programming that it carries in terms of the languages that it carries in terms of the
way in which programmes are scheduled the SABC may appear to be more
commercialised than public. That occurrence is in the process of being reversed
in the sense that the commercial side will operate commercially and the public
broadcaster would then concentrate on meeting the public mandate inclusive of a
certain quota in news a certain quota in languages. What we've done is that
we've taken, because we understand that it's an investment, a gradual approach.
In three years time the SABC is going to look totally different and that refers to
sound broadcasting and television broadcasting.
M-net has an open window which is a period from 5pm to 7pm where
114
viewers without M-net decoders can watch its programmes. This is a cause
for concern for other broadcasters such as e-TV for example because
during this time they have to compete for non-subscribing viewers with a
subscription broadcaster. What has the ICASA decided to do about this?
We've decided that next year the open window be closed. It was a well
considered decision. It was a public process a licence amendment process.
We've put together a document that talks to it. Part of the reason is the fact that
we allowed the situation to continue until such time that there was a decisive
subscription broadcasting policy which came out in June. The week after that we
then made the determination that next year we're are going to close the open
window. Outlining for one that for a long time M-net was operating, by virtue of an
open window, a free-to-air service which was an anomaly in a subscription. It was
not making for fair competition in the sense that during that time slot it was
competing for a higher LSM audience base with all the other broadcasters that
are meant to _only operate on the basis of advertising revenue, whereas they
could source subscription fees, so the open window is going to be closed.
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